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INSTRUCTIONS
FOR
OFFICERS
DETACHED IN THE FIELD:
CONTAINING
A SCHEME FOR FORMING
A PARTISAN.

ILLUSTRATED BY PLANS.

—Fas est et ab hoste doceri. OVID.

L O N D O N:
SOLD BY CADELL, WILSON, PAYNE;
AND BY FOULIS IN GLASGOW,
M.DCC.LXX. †

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P R E F A C E.

THOUGH we have numberless treatises on military subjects, it has always been regretted that none of the authors have descended lower than to instruct generals in the operations of armies, excepting those who confine themselves to the duties of the parade and garrison, so that inferior officers have had no source from whence they could derive any instruction or information of the duties of their sphere in the field, even though they may have ransacked all the military writers from Vegetius to our books of discipline. The instructions on the sublime parts of war are perfect, none however but general officers have occasion to consult them for any purpose but speculation, while the art of carrying on the *Petite Guerre* and fortifying the lesser posts in the field, which is the busi-

ness of every rank, has remained unheeded, as if unworthy the notice of military writers, till Monsieur Le Cointe, and Mr. De Jeney, published their treatises during the course of last war.

From these works, compared with the opinions and observations of particular friends, I have collected such information in the following essay, as, I hope, may be of service to my brother-officers who are solicitous of improvement on that head.

Every one knows of what importance even the smallest detachments are to an army, and must be sensible that if they happen to be commanded by officers who are ignorant of their duty, they can neither expect to procure advantage to the army, nor honour to themselves: but as it is only on occasion of being employed in commanding small detachments, that the inferior officers can hope to signalize themselves; the knowledge of this particular branch, is an object the most worthy of their study and regard. Nor can an of-

ficer who would distinguish himself as an alert partisan, be too minutely acquainted with a subject of as much importance to him, as he is important to the army with whom he serves; especially since the present method of forming strong corps under partisans has prevailed.

The duties of the field and garrison have so little resemblance that they may be reckoned distinct professions. We have authors to instruct us in the minutest points of garrison-duty; but none to teach the subaltern officers their particular duties in the field; and I believe they would, in general, be greatly embarrassed if sent with detachments of thirty or fifty men with orders to intrench, or occupy a post.

Even Monsieur Clairac who writes expressly on the subject of posts in the field, confines himself to the great works which are constructed for the intrenching of armies, lines of communication, &c. which can be of little assistance to the subaltern officer who wants to intrench his detach-

ment: and yet the science of posts is one of the principal objects for a general to attend to, for upon that in a very great measure depends the security of the army, either in camp or on a march.

If to the science of posts be added the manoeuvres of the partisan in secret marches; occupying, defending, or attacking posts; reconnoitring countries or the enemy; placing of ambuscades; pursuits or retreats, &c. the whole method of carrying on the *Petite Guerre* will be known; and this it is the intention of the following essay to explain.

Those officers who were employed last war in the field against an enemy acquainted with the art of war, will see a detail with which their daily duties made them familiar; the rest of the army will be enabled to compare their services, with the contending against skilful regulars in the field; and they who have seen no service, will be instructed in the duties that their profession exposes them to when a new war calls on them.

Perhaps it may be pardonable to suggest, that the gentlemen of the Militia may some time or other derive some useful instruction from the following treatise. That they may long remain unpractised in war is my fervent wish, but as we cannot foresee the events of future wars, it may be no misfortune to have advice, how to improve the advantage which their knowledge of the country gives them, if they should at any time have occasion to step forth in defence of their property, and all they hold dear.

When every school is called an academy, and young gentlemen are promised an education for the army, we are sorry to see them come to regiments without any instruction that relates particularly to the profession, except perhaps the theory of geometry and fortification. The different branches of the mathematics taught in these academies are certainly very useful, but are they sufficient to give any idea of war? When

the pupils leave these academies, have they brought with them any notion of pitching a tent; fixing a camp; mounting a guard; going the night-patroles between two armies; constructing a redoubt; defending an intrenchment, or attacking a post? We cannot think it is possible, reasonings and drawings will not serve.

The art of war is much the same as our masters the Romans taught it, only that gun-powder has supplanted the flower operations of the *ballista* and *catapulta*. The *Campus Martius* was their military academy where they learned the art of war by practice, under the eyes of experienced officers; and were the pupils of our academies shewn the manoeuvres that happen most frequently in a campaign, which every military man ought to know; they would not leave the academies like simple scholars, but formed foldiers; capable of service; conducting parties; intrenching posts, and opposing the enemy; and a small spot of ground

would be sufficient to shew the different operations that render the foundation of the science familiar to the pupils.

In this country we have not been the first to copy the great masters in the art of war, nay we are indebted to our neighbours for the very terms of the art, for which reason an explanation of any of the terms made use of in the following essay, which our English dictionaries have not adopted, will be given in the course of it.

A greater number of well authenticated facts might have been collected and introduced to illustrate the particular subjects, but this would have been inconsistent with the particular design of a work intended to comprise every necessary instruction within the compass of a pocket-volume, to be consulted on any emergency.

MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS

FOR OFFICERS.

CHAP. I.

*Of the practical Geometry necessary for an
Officer.*

AS the smallest detachments of an army may have occasion in the course of their service to construct some works of defence, it is the duty of every officer to acquire such a knowledge of geometry as will enable him to direct the execution of them ; and as many officers may have neglected that branch of education before their coming to the army, it may be necessary and agreeable to them to be informed of the method of executing them with ease and precision, when they may not have either inclination or

opportunity to study ; and therefore we imagine it will be proper to begin this essay with some instructions in the practical geometry necessary for officers.

Geometry, which is the most agreeable part of the mathematics, is the science of measuring, and the knowledge of it in all its parts is indispensably necessary to engineers ; but to the officers of the army, who never have occasion to direct the construction of large fortifications, the geometry necessary for them to know, may be reduced to a small compass.

The works in the field, which they may cause to be made, are so simple, that they have only to mark out straight lines, horizontals, parallels, perpendiculars, and curves, knowing the relation they bear to one another for the execution. But as the drawing of these figures with rules and compasses upon paper, is very different from tracing them out upon the ground, we shall shew how that is practised, so as not only to satisfy the scholar who has been taught the theory of geo-

metry, but serve likewise to guide the officer, who is unacquainted with the subject, in marking out the intrenchments, with which he may fortify posts that are entrusted to him.

The instruments necessary for engineers might be described, and their uses shewn, and likewise what officers may substitute in place of those that are not portable; but that the memories and persons of officers on service, may be encumbered as little as possible, a piece of whipcord twenty yards long, may be made to answer every purpose that an officer on detachment has occasion for. At one end it should have a loop large enough to pass over the head of a tent-pin or picket, and at every six feet (which is a toise) it should be marked with a knot tied hard.

This is sufficient for tracing out intrenchments, but the detachment must have spades, pick-axes, hatchets, and wood-bills for removing earth and cutting wood; and no party however small

should march to a post without one or two of each kind. We come now to the manner of tracing.

Plate I. To trace a right line from A
Fig. 1. to B, plant a picket at the point A, and pass the loop of the cord over it, and stretch it tight to B, with a second picket ; this done, draw a line along the ground with the point of a third picket, touching the cord lightly all along.

Fig. 2. To raise a perpendicular line at the point C of the line DE, plant a picket at the point C as center, putting the loop of the cord over it, then with the point of another picket tied to the cord at a toise distance, describe the semicircle FG ; then from the points F and G, where pickets should be planted, trace at the distance of two or three toises, the arches H and I ; then put the loop again over the picket C, which stretch tightly towards L, in passing through the section of the arches H and I, and trace the line CL, which will be perpendicular to the line DE.

If the perpendicular M is to be raised at one of the extremities of the line NO, you must continue the line to P, and trace the semicircle QR, finishing as above. Fig. 3.







But if the point S, from whence you would let fall a perpendicular line, is out of the line TV, you must plant a picket at the point S, and passing over the loop of the cord, draw the portion of the circle XY; then from the points X and Y, where pickets are planted, trace with the cord at one length the arches at Z, and passing a line from where they cut at Z to the given point S, it will be perpendicular to the line TV. Fig. 4.

This is the manner of tracing a perpendicular with precision, however, as the operation is a little complex, and you may not always have time to do it, it will be sufficient to attend to the cord being stretched from *a* to *b*, to trace it by making two right angles with the line *cd*, by the guess of your eye. Fig. 5.

Fig. 6. To trace two parallel lines, you must, after having described the first line eb , measure the distance at which you would trace the parallel, which suppose at g . Place a picket at the point g , as center, and describe the indefinite arch hi ; then from the point b , as center, describe the arch eg ; then take upon the first arch the part hi , equal to eg , and draw the line gi , which will be parallel to the line eb .

But as the works which officers have occasion to raise are but of little extent, and they may neglect such precision, the operation may be abridged by measuring with the cord at the two ends of the line eb , two equal distances, eg and hi , as perpendicular as possible by the guess of the eye, and from the marked points trace the line gi , which will be parallel to the line eb .

We shall give the manner of tracing a triangle, a perfect square, and a circle, when we come to tell how to trace redoubts; but we shall not mention any





figures which are used only in the construction of great works.

As the operations by which they trace right lines, perpendiculars, parallels and angles, are what mostly occur in field-fortifications, the young officers would do well to practise them often. The stay they sometimes make in camp; their leisure hours during peace and in garrison, may be employed in these amusements, at which the soldiers will chearfully assist for a small recompence, which will have the additional advantage of making the men expert, when they come upon service.

C H A P. II.

*Of the different Works with which Posts
may be fortified.*

IT may appear, that we ought not to give the method of intrenching posts, till we have spoken of the detachments to be sent there, and who are almost always charged with this work; but the tracing the geometrical figures having led to that of intrenchments, it was thought that this would be the properest place.

Posts are generally such places as bodies of troops can fix in when detached from the army; to cover and secure the frontiers, and upon the vigilance and resistance of the parties that are detached there, depends the safety of the army. Whatever the abilities of a general may be, it is scarce possible that he can have an eye to every detail that contributes to their defence; it is sufficient if he

knows that the guards are properly placed, and the line that they make properly established. It is then the business of the particular officers who command them, to make the best disposition for a vigorous defence, and answering the views of the general.

An officer who is detached to a post is either to relieve a party, or take possession for the first time. In the first case, if the guard which he relieves happens to be intrenched, as soon as he arrives at the post and has taken his instructions from the officer who commands, he should prepare himself for his defence, as shall be mentioned in that article. In the second, if an officer who is detached is to intrench himself, he must examine if the place is advantageous for the execution of his projects, the defence of his people, and the securing a retreat.

He must consult 1st whether the situation be convenient for sending parties to discover the enemy; whether to give intelligence of their situation and march,

or to disturb and surprise them. 2d, If it has some natural defence on its front or flanks, such as a river, rivulet, morafs or small wood that can be easily penetrated. 3d, If he can preserve his communication with the army, and if there are some covered places to favour his retreat. 4th, If he can discover all the approaches, because if the enemy can come within a small distance of the post without being seen, he will place himself under cover there, and rest while the besieged are obliged to remain continually under arms, and will watch the moment for making an attack. If then he finds hollow roads, clumps of wood, or any place where the enemy can secure himself in the neighbourhood of his post, he must fill them up, or guard them with detachments of six or seven men. 5th, He must take care not to be commanded by any neighbouring heights, or to prevent the enemy from profiting by that advantage, because if they can take his soldiers in the rear, it will be impossible for them to de-

send themselves. You will see afterwards how to ward off this inconvenience, when you cannot prevent being exposed to these heights. 6th, The extent of the work must be proportioned to the number of men that are to defend it. Good sense and numberless examples prove, that too large intrenchments (such as are commonly constructed) can only be defended by considerable bodies. Excesses of this kind are extremely reprehensible, and it were much more eligible to give in to the opposite, by making them smaller. 7th, He should take care to have all the parts of his intrenchment nearly of an equal strength, so as to be able to make an equal resistance every where; and lastly, he will take care to fulfill exactly the intention of the general in posting a guard in that place.

There are some places so advantageously posted by nature, that though they are not fortified, they may in a short time and with little charge be made so strong, that it will require as much art to be-

siege them as many others that are perfect fortifications; such as islands, peninsulas, and places seated on eminencies of difficult access, or in morasses.

If the post is in a level country, or upon a height that may be furrounded, as happens almost always to small detachments, they should construct a redoubt or small square fort, composed of a parapet with its banquette and ditch.

The ground being chosen, you must trace a straight line AE, [Plate II.] and raise the perpendicular BC, as directed in the practical geometry, observing to give to each of these lines which mark the interior side of the parapet but two toises or two and a half for thirty men; four toises for fifty, and eight for an hundred, which will leave a space of two feet at least against the parapet for each man.

Having traced the two first lines A, B, you must put the cord over the picket C of the perpendicular B, and with the same length trace the arch D, then

put the cord over the picket E of the line A, and trace the arch F. The point where the arches intersect each other, is the point to end the lines EH and CG. These four lines mark the interior side of the parapet.

Then trace four other lines at the distance of two or three feet parallel to the first, as I, L, M, N, to mark the size of the banquette, which should be greater or less, according to the number of soldiers you would place in a file. Then trace a third parallel square on the outside of the first, as O, P, Q, R, to mark the exterior side of the parapet, and to determine its thickness, which is usually eight or nine feet, or eighteen if it is to resist cannon, which you should always be prepared to do.

Then trace a fourth and last square ST VX, to determine the width of the ditch, which is the same or two feet more than the thickness of the parapet, leaving a picket planted at all the angles, as likewise at the lines already traced, so as not

to lose the points from whence the lines were drawn.

While you are employed with two or three men in tracing, five or six men should be ordered to cut down the trees that are in the neighbourhood of the post, not only to open the approaches, but to serve for constructing the intrenchments. The smallest branches serve to make fascines, which are a sort of faggots about six feet long, two feet thick, and of the same size all over, tied in the middle and at the two ends, to serve for supporting the earth, which would tumble down without that support. The middling branches serve to make pickets proper for mixing with the fascines, and fixing them in the ground, or one above another to raise the parapet. The trunks to which the large branches are left, serve to increase the strength of a post as shall be mentioned afterwards.

Having traced all in the manner directed, fix a row of fascines upon the small square ILMN, to support the earth

of the banquette; then fix a second row upon the square ABGH, to support the interior side of the parapet; then a third row on the third square OPQR, to support the exterior side of the parapet. You should observe in beginning to picket the fascines, to leave a passage of three feet PB, on the side least exposed to the enemy, to serve for an entry to the redoubt, but if this passage can be taken in a straight line, it should be made like a mortise as you see at Y.

After having picketed the three rows of fascines as directed, you must dig the ditch AB, as in the profile of Plate II, a foot distant from the exterior side of the parapet. This distance or breadth is called *berme*, and serves to support the earth, or receive what falls from the parapet by the enemy's cannon. This *berme* is more or less according to the solidity of the earth; the earth to be thrown into the intervals C, D, E, marked for the parapet and banquette, taking care to make the men tread it well down,

and observing to leave a *talus* or *slope* on the two sides of the ditch FG more or less, according to the consistence of the earth, so that it may not tumble down. The slope F, which is on the side of the redoubt, is called, *the scarp*, and the opposite slope which is next the country, is called, *the counterscarp*. Care must be taken in picketing the fascines with which the parapet is raised, to bring them nearer one another by degrees in raising it as at H, so as to leave the same slope on each side. The distance DE mark the banquette; the distance DC the thickness of the parapet at the bottom; the distance IL the thickness of the parapet at the top; MN the width of the ditch at bottom; AB the width of the ditch at top.

If the ground is level, the banquette of this work must be raised two feet, but in low places two banquettes are necessary, the one above the other like steps; but if this banquette is raised on account of some neighbouring heights from

whence you may be taken in the rear, the parapet must be raised to such a height that the enemy's shot can no longer plunge down upon you. A slope must be left on the top of the parapet, as LL, so that the soldiers may see round the post, and fire easily towards the country at Q.

Though the square form of a redoubt which we have given the method of constructing is almost the only one used in the field, yet it has its faults, which ought to make it be rejected, at least for these posts which ought to defend the environs equally. Experience shews us that we ought never to depend on the oblique firing of musquetry, as the soldiers almost always fire right forwards as at A, [Plate III. fig. 1.] and often even without taking aim. This being the case, there are large spaces opposite to the angles of the redoubt at B that are not defended, and where we may say that the enemy remains in safety. The Chevalier Clairac proposes an excellent method to prevent

this inconvenience, by constructing the interior edge of the parapet, like the edge of a saw in form of small *redans* to hold a man or two in each side, [Plate IV.] which by the cross fire takes the enemy on the two flanks, so that there are no approaches but what are defended; but the construction of this redoubt is too tedious and complex to be executed by small detachments.

The same author prefers constructing circular redoubts as at G, [Plate III. fig. 2.] because all the points of the circumference being equally disposed, the soldier posts himself indifferently over all, and the exterior spaces D which are defended, varying every moment, the enemy is no where in safety.

The circular redoubt then is the most perfect that can be constructed, but where a road or the edge of a river is to be defended, the square, or long, or triangular redoubt is preferable, because they ought to oppose the faces of the intrenchment as parallel as possible to the places

they are to fire at, observing always to round the angles.

To trace a circular redoubt, after fixing the central point of the post, let a picket be fixed in that point, and draw from it as center, the circle EE, with a length of cord in proportion to the number of the party*, to mark the interior side of the parapet; then trace another within the first, at the distance already given, to mark the banquette, then trace a third FF, to mark the exterior edge of the parapet, then trace a fourth GG, to mark the width of the ditch, which being done, picket the fascines, and make them take the bend of the circle, finishing as in a square redoubt.

If an officer is posted with a detachment on a passage or before a bridge, in a defile, or opposite to a ford, he may make a parapet either bending or straight,

* If there are thirty men, a toise and a half of the cord, if fifty men, two toises; if for a hundred, double the proportions, unless you would place the men two or three deep.

with a banquette or ditch which should shut up the whole entry; or he may make a *redan*, which is a work with two faces, and in such a situation should be made with a re-entrant angle, (that is, the angle pointing from the enemy,) taking care when he is to guard a ford, to construct it so near the river that the enemy cannot have room to form after they have passed. A deep ditch may be dug opposite to the ford, into which they should let the water of the river pass; they may likewise make the banks steep; throw trees across, and scatter chauffe-traps, which are instruments of iron with four spikes made so as to have always one point erect.

The strength of a redoubt or any other work may be augmented by blocking up the passages that lead to it; in a mountainous country, by cutting large ditches perpendicularly down, across the roads; by placing carts above one another in the defiles with some soldiers behind them, and by throwing wherever

Fig. 2.




Fig. 1.
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





Fig. 1.






Fig. 2.









it is necessary, large branches of trees half buried in the ground; taking care not to break the way by which you must retire, so as to prevent your making a retreat; but on the contrary to leave an easy passage made in form of a draw-bridge, or any other way defended by seven or eight soldiers.

If detached into a level country, very deep ditches should be dug in the avenues and approaches of the post; or deep pits covered over with small branches and a little earth over them; taking care to scatter the earth that is dug out all round, so that the enemy may not be able to discover whereabouts they are; and chauffe-traps may likewise be scattered in the avenues and on the glacis. Lastly, they may plant pickets all round the post near to one another inclining a little outwards, six feet out of the ground, and the points made sharp after being drove.

But the most formidable obstacle, and which is preferred by Monsieur Folard, is to shut up the defiles, to block up the


roads, furrounding the post with felled trees, and sinking their trunks three or four feet deep in the earth, which must be dug on purpose, leaving a number of large branches on them, which must be sharpened at the ends, and the leaves taken away, and placed as near to one another as possible, so that the branches may mix, and taking care that they incline towards the enemy. Two or three rows may be made in this manner, but they should be at least two toises distant from each other, that the enemy may not burn them all at once, to approach the intrenchments. Marshal Saxe in his *Reveries* says, that redoubts are proportionably advantageous as they take less time in constructing; and are proper for numberless circumstances, where one often may serve to stop an army in a close country; hinder them from troubling you on a critical march, or to occupy a large space of country when you have but few troops.

Intrenchments are sometimes made

with felled trees alone, when there is no design, or time is wanting to raise an intrenchment of earth. The trunks should be placed towards you, and very close upon one another, with the branches sharpened and pointing to the enemy. This makes a very formidable parapet when rounded, so as to prevent the enemy getting sight of your people. There is no need to mention large works, which require engineers to construct, and great bodies to defend them; but a redoubt, such as A, [Plate V.] may be strengthened by filling the ditch with water, by turning a rivulet, or cutting a river or pond. If the ground is uneven, so that the water cannot be put equally in all parts of the ditch, dams should be left in digging at C; or little traverses of earth to form banks proper for keeping the water in the upper part of the ditch D, from whence it may be let run into the lower E. These banks should have but half a foot in thickness at the height D, which should be raised sharp,

but a good deal more must be left below at E, by sloping the two sides pretty much. Dams likewise are made of planks or boards, as at F; but they must be strong, and supported by large stakes, so that the body of water above may not overturn them, and then they are reckoned preferable to those that are of earth.

View of a Redoubt



Explanation.

- A. The ground within the Redoubt.
- B. The bottom of the Ditch.
- CDE Dam of Earth.
- F Dam of Planks.
- G. Upper part of the redoubt constructed of fascines & the Earth dug out of the Ditch.
- H. The lower part of the Redoubt dug in the Earth.
- I. The Berme or space left at the Bottom of the Parapet to support the Earth.
- L The Entry of the Parapet.
- M. The inside of the Parapet.
- N. The upper part of the Parapet.
- O. The Banquette.
- P The Glacis.
- Q Rivulet from whence Water may be let into the Ditch.

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C H A P. III.

*The manner of fortifying Churches, Mills,
and other detached Buildings.*

IT is not only with the works mentioned in the preceding chapter that an officer may fortify a post, but there are likewise an infinity of ways to stop an enemy, to tire him, and even to repulse him, which it is necessary that he should not be ignorant of.

All the schemes for opposing the enemy, of which we have given a detail, serve only to add to the exterior strength of posts; there are others which have some natural fortifications, such as churches, church-yards, mills, or farm-houses, &c. An officer who is sent to a post of this kind, which is detached from other buildings, ought to observe before he begins to work, to make the inhabitants go out, and the magistrates of the nearest place to receive and lodge them. You

should then intrench the house with a turning parapet, if you have people enough to defend it ; but if you have only a few, you should make a breast-work of felled trees round the house, especially opposite to the angles, to prevent the enemy from undermining it. You must likewise take off the tiles and flates, lest the enemy get up by ladders, and crush your people that are within. If the house is covered with thatch, it should be pulled off and burnt, as well as every thing combustible that can be found in the neighbourhood, lest the enemy make use of it against the house.

Though the house is surrounded with a parapet of felled trees, you should not fail to pierce the walls with loop-holes, about a foot from the ground, so as to discover the enemies legs, that they may not get footing on the outside. These loop-holes should be four inches wide, and three feet distant from one another ; and a little ditch should be made a foot and a half from the wall within the

house, to place the foldiers in who are to defend it. Other loop-holes fhould likewise be pierced feven or eight feet from the ground, oppofite to the interfices of the lower ones, and of the fame width, placing the foldiers that are to defend them upon tables, planks, or ladders; and taking care to pierce a greater number oppofite to the avenues, before, and at the fides of the gate, and the angles of the houfe, becaufe thefe are the places where the enemy ufually makes his greateft efforts. If the houfe has an inner court, the walls fhould be pierced which inclofe it, fo as to fire upon the enemy after he has made himfelf mafter of it.

If there are feveral gates, they fhould all be blocked up except one to be left for an entrance to the poft, which fhould be made fo as to admit but one man at a time.

If there are low windows which are not grated, they fhould be fhut up with dung, planks, ftones, earth or trees. If

there are any out-houses, such as stables, cellars, &c. several trees should be buried up to the branches before them, to prevent the enemy from forming, if they are about to penetrate into the house; and one or two trees should be put three or four feet within the entry, to prevent the enemy from penetrating right forward.

If there is a broad staircase for going up to the first floor, it should be broke down, or blocked up with stones or casks filled with earth. If it is a winding stair, the wall should be pierced in different places with loop-holes, to fire upon the enemy that are already entered, keeping ladders for yourselves to get up to the first floor, which should have the boards pierced with a number of holes about four inches diameter, to fire down upon the enemy, observing to pierce them only where there are no trees below, but to have a greater number over the door, and other weak places which the enemy can force:

Loop-holes should be pierced breast-high in the wall of the first floor, with about ten inches opening, and opposite to the interstices of those immediately below. If there are not people enough to defend the windows of the first floor, they should be barricadoed, to prevent the enemy from firing upon those within; and a large opening should be made in the pavement opposite to each window a little longer than the width of the window, which is to serve by way of ditch, into which you may tumble those who penetrate that way.

The same may be done with the second and third floors, so that there may be an equal resistance over all; but instead of piercing loop-holes in the highest floor, the tiles and slates being taken away, the wall may be taken down to breast-high for the men to fire over, the stones kept to throw upon the enemy, and the rafters to throw upon the ladders which happen to be placed against the house. A post intrenched in this

manner may resist a great while, and even tire out the besiegers, if defended by resolute men.

Captain d'Enfernay of a French regiment with a company of volunteers, in the campaign of 1748, took post in the church of Bevera, two miles from Ventimiglia. It is detached from other buildings, and he fortified it with a parapet and ditch full of water; but his intrenchment was commanded by some houses in the village, so that the enemy could fire down upon his party. He remedied this defect by covering the commanded part with a kind of *blind* made with rafters leaning one end on the wall of the church, and the other upon posts raised a foot higher than the top of the parapet, which left room to fire through. This *blind* covered with fascines and earth, prevented the enemy's fire from piercing, and did not prevent his firing upon them, so that they durst not attack him.

This example is mentioned to shew how to secure a post that is commanded

by a height. When there is no redoubt or intrenchments of earth, the interior side of the parapet which is commanded should be raised, or a sort of penthouse should be made with rafters, placed perpendicularly against the inner side of the parapet, upon which, planks or fascines are nailed, taking care to leave room between the bottom of the penthouse, and the top of the parapet for the men to fire through.

If an officer has not time to oppose all the schemes which have been mentioned to the enemy, when the general wants to make a forage, and throws infantry into the house to form a line, he should immediately place a couple of trees across before the door, pierce the boards, shut the windows, and prepare for his defence; which gives time to the foragers to retire, and the supporting parties to advance.

C H A P. IV.

Of the manner of fortifying Villages.

THE manner of intrenching which has been mentioned, is only for posts that are detached from any building; but if an officer has a village to defend, he may cut out a much harder piece of work for the enemy. When we speak of intrenching a village, it is meant only of such as have the houses collected, and sometimes surrounded with a wall. An officer detached to a post of this nature, ought to go several times round it, and observe the adjacent houses before he begins to intrench, and cause loopholes to be pierced in them: the entries of those that have passages leading to the country should be blocked up with trees, and if he has time, he should make a good parapet of felled trees and intrench the entries of the streets.

An officer who would fortify a post

of some extent, ought to make a kind of plan of the village, and the intrenchments which he intends, which will often furnish ideas of defence, which escape on viewing the country. A street is to be defended like a ford or bridge with a *redan*, as in chapter second, or with a simple parapet in a semi-circle with a ditch; making loop-holes in the houses at the entrance, and deep ditches across the streets, with *chauffe-traps* thrown into the bottom of them. The streets should be blocked up with trees, carts, and casks; you should likewise open several passages in the back parts of the houses, to keep up a communication with the different streets; but above all, if you have but few men, the middle of every open place or square must be filled with felled trees, to prevent the enemy from forming if he penetrates.

As cannon or fire are most to be dreaded in the defence of a village, an officer ought to break up the roads by which cannon can pass, which is an easy mat-

ter in a mountainous country; but if the village happens to be in a plain, large ditches should be cut across the avenues, at every little interval placing trees across that take up the whole breadth. If there is time, the joists of the houses should be propped up with trunks of trees, or large pieces of wood put like bricklayers' horses to prevent their tumbling down and crushing the besieged. The best security against fire, is to burn all the materials that an enemy can make use of for that purpose; but if there is a quantity of wood, straw, or hay, the general should be asked whether he chooses to have it burnt, or carried off to supply the army.

Another essential thing for an officer to attend to who is detached to a village, is to secure his retreat in case he is forced at the entry of the street, or in his first intrenchments; he should therefore choose a church or large house separate from the rest, after having dislodged the inhabitants. When soldiers who defend a

post know that they have a place to retreat to, they do not think of surrendering while they see themselves in a state of obtaining an honourable capitulation. But if the houses of a village are scattered, and there are gardens or courts in the center, they must be content with intrenching a single house, church, or church-yard, where they may be covered with an intrenchment of earth, and employ all the schemes which I have already given in the preceding chapter.

If the works with which posts, especially villages, are fortified, were to be executed by the soldiers of the detachments, who ought never to be fatigued, it would be too laborious and tedious; therefore an officer should cause a number of peasants by the appointment of the magistrates to work alone, or jointly with a third of the party, while two thirds remain under arms to prevent surprises. The soldiers and peasants should

be relieved every three hours by fresh men, taking care that they have no concealed arms, and work without interruption 'till the work is compleated.

C H A P. V.

Of the Corps of a Partisan.

AFTER having given the manner of fortifying posts, we come now to speak of those who are to defend them.

They generally call every officer a partisan who is destined to go at the head of a detachment, whether draughted from the body of the army, or of a party which he belongs to, and for that reason has no other name than that of a partisan.

This corps is a light party from one hundred to two thousand men, separated from the army, to secure the camp or a march; to reconnoitre the enemy or the country; to seize their posts, convoys, and escorts; to plant ambuscades, and put in practice every stratagem for surprising or disturbing the enemy; which is called carrying on the *Petite Guerre*.

The genius of these days, and the operations of the last war, have placed the service of such a corps in a most respectable light, as it is more fatiguing, more dangerous, and more extensive.

To form a corps capable of carrying on the *Petite Guerre* to advantage, prudence requires that it should consist of a thousand men at least, without which a partisan cannot expect to support the fatigues of a campaign, and seize the most important occasions that every where offer, and which a too great inferiority must make him forego.

It is no less important that this corps should be composed of infantry and cavalry; and as it is incontestible that the cavalry ought to be the most active in carrying on the *Petite Guerre*, it were to be wished that they were likewise the strongest, so as to have six hundred cavalry and four hundred infantry in a corps of a thousand men, making four companies of infantry and twelve troops of cavalry.

Each company of infantry to consist of one captain, one first, and two second lieutenants, four serjeants, and ninety-six men, including four corporals, four lance-corporals, and two drummers. Each troop of cavalry to consist of one captain, one first, and one second lieutenant, a quarter-master, two serjeants and forty-eight horsemen, including four corporals, a trumpeter and farrier.

The commanding officer should have the naming of the officers of this corps, or at least have liberty to reject such as he is convinced are not qualified for such service, as every officer who may be ambitious to serve in the corps, though possessed of great military merit, may not have the talents requisite for the duties of the partisan.

To support the honour of this corps upon a solid and respectable footing, the strictest subordination must extend from the chief to all the officers, and the most rigid discipline inspire vigilance, patience, bravery, and love of glory to the whole corps.

As to other corps of partisans formed of one or more detachments, drawn from the different regiments of the army, and composed with a view to some particular expedition, their strength and quality is regulated by the circumstances of the affair they undertake, and are more or less numerous according to the exigency of the projected scheme. I should not add any thing upon this subject, if I did not know how important it is for the officer that commands, to have the choosing his men and officers whom he knows to be fittest for his enterprize, and thereby preventing many difficulties, contradictions, and dangers, which jealousy and distrust always occasion among strangers.

Prejudice still divides our sentiments about the size of a soldier; some requiring the tallest size for horse and foot, imagining that a proportionable strength accompanies size, and that they can longer resist the fatigue of the *Petite Guerre*. Others prefer a middling size for this ser-

vice, expecting them to be more capable of fatigue than taller men. When we cast our eyes on the regiments of the king of Prussia, composed of the tallest men in Europe, who neither know ease nor rest, we see none of other armies supporting the rudest fatigues of war better. Partiality to our own size prejudices the generality of men, but when we see the tall men with longer limbs marching at a greater rate with ease, I am for preferring the tallest men that are to be got, when well limbed, straight, and without any personal defect or corpulence, for a foot soldier.

The practice that prevails at present in the choice of men for the light dragoons, makes it unnecessary to mention the advantage of preferring a low size for cavalry, that are to act with the greatest swiftness, or the disadvantage of horses being incumbered with unwieldy riders. It is sufficient to say, that none should exceed five feet and five or six inches, for the cavalry of the partisan.

No recruit for the corps of a partisan, either cavalry or infantry, should exceed thirty years of age, but the younger they are, if they can carry arms, so much the better for such a service, to which youth are particularly inclined, and recruits may be met with every where; but when the necessities of war do not oblige officers to accept of indifferent men, they cannot serve the corps more essentially than in the choosing good recruits. We learn from Vegetius, that the best service is to be expected from men brought up to severe labour, and exposed to the injuries of the weather; men brought up in ease and plenty cannot endure fatigue and want, and they who have tasted fewest of the sweets of life are the least subject to the fear of death. In the choice of recruits for the cavalry, it were not unworthy the attention of officers to prefer men that are lovers of horses, and to recruit chiefly in those countries where such are mostly to be expected. The excellent condition of the second regi-

ment of dragoons last war, while the other regiments were reduced to a very low condition every campaign, evidently shews that such a fancy is not chimerical, as it has been always attributed to the inclinations of the men, and none of the officers were ever heard to assume to themselves the least merit on that score.

As for arms, the firelock and bayonet is sufficient for a foot soldier; but in the corps of the partisan, I should prefer barrels of thirty-six inches with a long bayonet, but to have the caliber the same with the rest of the army, which for the sake of having ammunition made up to suit the whole, ought to be invariably the same; and for the more convenient method of carrying their ammunition, I would recommend the German manner, of having their cartridges placed horizontal, and covered with wax-cloth, instead of our wooden blocks; I would likewise prefer a helmet to our hats, as the sword is almost the only thing to be dreaded from the enemy's cavalry. Four

spades, and four pick-axes should be given to each company of infantry.

The present manner of equipping the light dragoons is so perfect, it is unnecessary to say any thing on that head, but no white horse, stone-horse or mare, should be suffered in the corps of the partisan, as the least neighing or perceivable colour may make enterprizes fail. No horse should be mounted for service till six years old. The size of the light dragoons is very proper for the partisan, and while they have firm ground to act upon, and plenty of forage, none can excell them; but when they come among morasses, and feel the severity of want, perhaps the Hungarian hussars may be found more equal to the duty: I should therefore suppose, that in forming the corps of the partisan, two hundred horse, such as are bred in the mountains of Wales or Scotland, mounted by the lightest men, might be found of good service.

The principal attention of an officer of cavalry should be, to see that the men

feed and dress their horses well. Hay, straw, and oats, are their common food; too much hay is not good, but when they find wheat-straw newly threshed, they may give them more of it, as it is excellent nourishment. During the whole campaign they should have dry food only, as green weakens them.

When the exigency of the service requires the horses to be kept saddled day and night, every horseman should seize some moment to turn the saddle-cloth, which greatly comforts a horse, keeps him at ease, and less apt to gall, and care should be taken to keep the cloth soft, and clean from sweat and dust.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Qualifications necessary in a Partisan.

OF all military employments, there is none which requires more extraordinary qualities than that of the partisan. Without entering into too minute a detail, I shall only mention the more indispensable, whether on the side of favours from nature, or habits acquired by his own particular attention.

A good partisan ought to have an imagination fertile in projects, schemes, and resources; a penetrating spirit, capable of combining the whole circumstances of an action; a heart intrepid against every appearance of danger; a steady countenance, always assured, and that no signs of disquiet can alter; a happy memory, that can call every one by his name; a disposition alert, robust, and indefatigable, to carry him through eve

ry thing, and give a soul to the whole; a piercing rapid eye, which instantly catches faults or advantages, obstacles and dangers of situation, of country, and every object as it passes; his sentiments such, as to fix the respect, confidence, and attachment of the whole corps. Without these dispositions, it is impossible to succeed.

A partisan ought to understand Latin, German, and French, to converse with all nations. He ought to have a perfect knowledge of the service, especially light troops, without being ignorant of the enemy's. He should have the exactest map of the theatre of the war, examine it well, and become perfect master of it. It would be very advantageous to have some good geographers under his command, capable of drawing plans, routes of armies, situation of camps, and wherever they may have occasion to reconnoitre.

He ought to spare nothing to be assured by his spies of the march, force, de-

signs, and position of the enemy. These discoveries will enable him to serve his general essentially, and must contribute infinitely to the safety of the army, the support, happiness, and glory of his own corps. His honour and interest requires that he should keep a secretary, to make a journal of the campaign, to write down all orders which he either receives or gives; and in general, every action or march of the corps, so as to be able at all times to give an account of his conduct, and to justify himself against the attacks of criticism, which are never spared to a partisan.

As chief, he owes the example of an irreproachable conduct to his corps, circumspect in his cares like the affection of a parent, by which he will inspire respect, love, zeal, and vigilance, and gain the hearts of the whole to his service. It is extremely dangerous for such an officer to contract the least attachment to women, wine, or riches. The first makes him neglect his duty, and frequently oc-

casions the most ruinous treacheries : the second leads to dangerous indiscretions, and is sure to draw down contempt. The third leads to guilt, and destroys all sentiments of honour. The partisan must be content without the delicacies of the table, as he may be often exposed to want provision. His bed the same with the mens, a cloak and straw, never stripping but to change linen. Nothing animates soldiers so much, as the presence and vigilance of a commanding officer sharing with them the fatigues of the service ; the officers follow his example, the men are assured, encouraged, and content.

Nothing can be so dangerous to the safety of a corps, as a commander of a delicate indolent habit, for when officers are seen at their ease passing day and night at table, abandoning the safety of the post to the vigilance of the guard, who (not being responsible for the commissions of their officers) insensibly neglect their duty, and expose themselves to be easily surpris'd ; when the blow is

struck, then they lament, complain, and throw the blame on one another, but the general will make it fall upon the commanding officer.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Exercise.

THE exercise is the first part of the military art, and the more it is considered, the more essential it will appear. It frees their bodies from the rusticity of simple nature, and forms men and horses to all the evolutions of war; upon it depends the honour, merit, appearance, strength, and success of a corps; while we see the greatest corps for want of being exercised instantly disordered, and the disorder increasing in spite of command; the confusion oversets the art of the skilfullest masters, and the valour of the men only serves to precipitate the defeat; for which reason, it is the duty of every officer to take care that the recruits be drilled as soon as they join their corps.

It would be very useless to enlarge on the words of command, and the motions

practised in the exercise; I will neither criticise upon them, nor enlarge this volume by filling it up with what is to be found in so many military books of discipline; though I would recommend to every officer, to make himself perfectly master of the manoeuvres of the soldier, without which it is impossible that he can form the men, or distinguish himself in his profession.

The greatest advantage derived from the exercise, is the expertness with which men become capable of loading and firing, and teaching them an attention to act in conformity with those around them. It has always been lamented, that men have been brought on service, without being informed of the uses of the different manoeuvres they have been practising; and having no ideas of any thing but the uniformity of the parade, instantly fall into disorder and confusion when they lose the step, or see a deviation from the straight lines they have been accustomed to at exercise. It is a pity to see so much

attention confined to show, and so little given to instruct the troops in what may be of use to them on service. Though the parade is the place to form the characters of soldiers, and teach them uniformity, yet being confined to that alone, is too limited and mechanical for a true military genius.

Great industry and patience is necessary to form the habits of horses for the cavalry service, and were they accustomed constantly to hear all the noises of war, and to see fire and smoke immediately before feeding, they would not only be sooner reconciled, but from the hopes of feeding would be easily led into action. To the usual exercises, the cavalry of the partisan should be accustomed to galloping, leaping ditches, and swimming rivers.

The men of every corps should be accustomed to breaking, running, rallying, and forming quickly; but above all things to know, that though they may be a little disordered and huddled toge-

ther from the preffure of the enemy, that they are not therefore broke and to run away; but while they keep with their company and corps are ftill in a condition to act.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Subordination.

EVERY military man knows, that subordination consists in a perfect submission to the orders of superiors; in a perfect dependence, regulated by the rights and duties of every military man, from the private soldier to the general. Subordination ought to shew the spirit of the chief in all the members, and this single idea, which displays itself to the least attention, suffices to shew its importance.

Without subordination it is impossible that a corps can support itself; that its motions can be directed, order established, or the service carried on. In effect, it is subordination that gives a soul and harmony to the service; it gives strength to authority, and merit to obedience, it supports the staff of the marshal as the sword of the soldier, which secures the efficacy

of the command, and the honour of the execution; it is subordination which prevents every disorder, and procures every advantage to an army. But if it secures the rights of superiors, it likewise makes them answerable for the consequences; and if it reduces inferiors to blind subjection, it at the same time secures them from all reproach: so true it is, that in the failure of all enterprizes, the fault is laid on the commander alone, obedience justifying the rest.

To have subordination perfect, there are concessions to be made, as well on the side of the superiors who command, as of the subalterns who obey; and the confidence with which a sovereign honours an officer, is the only title required to authorize him in supporting the rights of his rank, therefore it were great imprudence to oppose it.

The voices of the officers, the waving of the colours and standards, the sound of trumpets, and the noise of drums, are so many echoes which explain and ex-

tend the orders of authority, to which every inferior owes a ready, respectful, and implicit submission. Such a solid obedience is always the fruit of the confidence, respect, and affection, which a corps has for its chief; it is then very important for him, and all his officers, to endeavour to inspire the men with these sentiments, and to fix them by a reciprocal attention to the character and wants of every individual.

Nevertheless, in spite of necessity, and all the advantages of subordination; in spite of the merit and good conduct of superiors, there happen a thousand occasions, where ambition, interest, libertinism, or fear, seek to violate it. There are dangerous characters, restless, jealous, turbulent spirits, vain, presumptuous, criticising souls, whom a superior ought to observe with care, to check their arrogance, and prevent their mutiny, by remedies which prudence suggests, and authority allows. He will employ promises and good offices to cure the timi-

dity of the weak, to excite their hope, raise their courage, and form their valour: he will equally put a stop to all the disorders of libertinism, and all the plunderings of a criminal avidity, by threatenings and chastisements regulated by equity, and the necessity of making examples.—An excellent divine, acknowledged by the whole corps as a man of probity and respectable zeal, who both by his conduct and discourse, excites and supports the most solid sentiments of religion, upon which alone true honour is founded, would be of great use to support union, justice, and dependence in the corps.

The most dangerous and common source from whence the very poison of subordination insensibly distills, is the violent impatience, or insupportable brutality of those who command, which excites resentment, revenge, and despair. Licentious and criticising discourses tend to murmurs, complaints and mutiny: mean complaisance or low familiarities

debase and destroy every consideration of essential respect. The instant an officer descends to be familiar with the men, all authority is subverted, and no obedience to be hoped for; on the contrary, the first urgent occasion he will find them mutiny and resist his commands; he cannot be too attentive in keeping them at a proper distance, and preserving the strictest subordination. The relaxation of discipline is at all times the destruction of soldiers, and shame of officers; who are less dishonoured by want of courage than want of application in their profession, and Marshal Saxe says, that we ought not to believe that subordination and servile obedience debases courage, for it has always been seen, that where the discipline has been most severe, the greatest actions have been done by the troops where it has been established.

Next to the attention of an officer in preserving subordination, he should take care not to lose courage on the defection of a few mutineers. The spirit

of rebellion never lays hold of a whole party at once, it is by the seditious discourse of two or three, that this spirit is infused into the rest. An officer who perceives it, should instantly command them to be silent, and if they continue, he should lay hold of the first firelock, and break the heads of the chief mutineers without mercy, threatening to hang all who fail in subordination. Several reasons could be given for this conduct, and examples cited to prove that this method, however severe it may seem, is the only one either to restrain a party of soldiers or the populace, but this is foreign to the present subject. •

C H A P. IX.

Of going on Detachment and secret Marches.

DETACHMENTS are particular bodies of foldiers detached from a greater body, to guard a poſt, or to go on an expedition.

When an officer is ordered on a detachment, he ſhould provide himſelf with a cord regularly divided, in caſe he has occaſion to intrench, and be at the parade by times, to get information from the brigade-major, whether he is deſtined to relieve a detachment, or to occupy a poſt for the firſt time. If to relieve a party, he is only to know where the guide is, who is to conduct him; the guide is a ſoldier ſent by the officer who is to be relieved, as orderly-man to the major general, who by having been at the poſt before, can lead a new detachment to it.

If it is a poſt that is to be occupied for the firſt time, the officer is to aſk the

brigade-major for instructions relating to its defence; which being got, he must inspect his party, and take care that every soldier is properly equipped; his firelock loaded, fresh primed, and a good flint well fixed; his cartouch-box filled with cartridges; and that he carries provision for twenty-four hours, which is the time that detachments commonly continue, and are not allowed to go away to eat. Care must be taken to have spades, pick-axes, hatchets and wood-bills, one or two of each kind; and if any thing is wanted, to apply to the brigade-major for it, that they may have every thing necessary for intrenching. Perhaps some young officers may say that these are precautions of which no one need be informed; but are they so little essential that they ought to be omitted? I appeal to those who know, whether it has not been the common practice for officers to march their detachments as soon as they have been told off, without any previous examination.

Is it reasonable to expect a soldier who wants any of the things that have been mentioned, can serve in the defence of a post as he ought? Let it not be said that it is the custom during the campaign to see the soldiers provided with every thing that is necessary, for there are many instances of their coming unprovided, and being not only useless, but an incumbrance in a post. Mr. Vauban says, the causes of succeeding so badly in these defences, is for the most part owing to the officers who do not provide utensils necessary for expeditions of this nature; and the source of this neglect, beside ignorance and imprudence, is too commonly owing to people's treating this article as trifling, though in effect they are the chief things they ought to attend to. It is better to take a hundred useless precautions, than to be wanting in one necessary one, because the smallest negligence may defeat the best concerted projects; though at the same time, they should not be discouraged by sup-

posing the enemy to be more vigilant than he truly is, or by starting difficulties that never may happen. If they were to stop at every supposition that may occur to the imagination in time of war, nothing would be executed.

One general rule in military projects that depend upon us alone, should be to omit nothing that can insure the success of our design; but to that which depends on the enemy, to trust something to hazard.

When an officer has inspected his party, he ought to get information from his guide, whether the way is broad or narrow; open or inclosed; if the enemy's posts are near; if they go on patroles, or see their parties in the day; and lastly, if he is to pass mills, farms, manors, &c. and from these informations, take the necessary precautions for his march.

Secret marches are such as are to be made unknown to the enemy, to reconnoitre, to surprise, or to cross a country which they occupy. It is here that a

commander has need of all his prudence to succeed and not to be betrayed. Before he sets out, he ought secretly to have procured the best information of the different routes that can be taken; the situation of the enemy's posts that are to be avoided; and the kind of country that is to be passed over. For better precaution it will be advantageous for the commanding officer to be provided with a plan in the manner to be explained in Chap. X. [Plan VIII.] It is likewise necessary to take one or two sure intelligent guides, of whose capacity you are taught to form a judgment in the same chapter. When there are too many of these people, some of them easily escape; they go to acquaint the enemy of your march; defeat your schemes; and expose you to be surpris'd.

When the whole are ready to march, the advanced guard A, [Plan VI.] which should consist of cavalry only, should set out. It is surpris'ing that all the authors who have wrote on this part of the art

of war, have neglected to shew sufficient attention to so essential a point : the greatest part are silent, and the rest passing slightly over the different duties of this corps, are content that it should be composed of infantry, though on the least reflection in the most ordinary cases of a secret march, reason must determine that none but cavalry ought to be placed there ; whether it be to stop passengers who may discover your route ; or suddenly to attack an advanced guard of the enemy whom they meet face to face ; or to harraßs their corps, in order to gain time for your own to form : it is incontestible that for all these purposes, cavalry has greatly the advantage of infantry ; who are by no means capable of running here and there to seize passengers, or of pouring suddenly on an advanced guard of the enemy ; or of resisting their cavalry a moment in case of a sudden rencounter, when they must expect to be thrown down and trod under the horses feet, and the corps at-

tacked before the commanding officer has had a moment to prepare for his defence.

As examples serve best to illustrate opinions that have been seldom declared, the spirited behaviour of Cornet Nangle of the 15th regiment of light dragoons merits our particular notice, and will serve as a proof of the great advantage of having the advanced guard of cavalry. In the campaign of 1761, when the French army under the command of Marshal Broglie and the Prince of Soubise were retiring towards Hoxter, where they passed the Weser, Prince Ferdinand followed close after them for several days, and on the evening before they gained the pass over the river, one of Prince Ferdinand's German aid de camps desired the grenadiers and Highlanders who were in front, to push on and take some of the enemy's baggage which was a little way before them, and but weakly guarded. They were immediately formed, and marched in a hurry over a plain

with a thick wood in front, which they were told was clear, and had got within four hundred paces of the enemy's baggage, when several squadrons of French dragoons rushed suddenly out upon them from the skirts of the wood upon both flanks, and were hewing them down without mercy, when Cornet Nangle with an advanced guard of twenty men coming up the hill got sight of the attack, and instantly rushing on, charged the French cavalry, who startled at the briskness of an attack which they were not expecting, immediately rein'd back; when the rest of the regiment getting in view, came on; and attacking the French, drove them off, having killed and wounded a few, and taken some prisoners. The determined bravery of this young officer with his twenty men saved a great number of the grenadiers and Highlanders from being cut to pieces, and shews what may be effected by the sudden attack of an advanced guard of cavalry.

An advanced guard by night should

be of double the force of one by day. In an open country, it is a matter of indifference at what distance they advance, provided they keep in view of the commanding officer, who should continually observe them: but in covered places, and in the darkness of the night, they should not be more than fifty paces distant.

This advanced guard should have an advanced corporal B, with six horsemen divided into three pairs; one in the center B, the two others out of the road on the right and left at CC, to examine as wide as possible, silently and attentively searching all hollow and covered places, taking care that there is no body lying on the ground, or hid in dry ditches, behind trees or bushes. At the same distance of fifty paces upon the flanks of the corps, should march two wings DD, consisting of eight or twelve horsemen each, according to the strength of the corps, led by a non-commissioned officer. They can harass an enemy who may happen to

rush suddenly out of an ambuscade, and give time to the corps to form. Each wing to detach two men EE, keeping fifty paces wide from the others, and preserving the same route as exactly as the face of the country will permit. At the entrance of the wood NN, the horsemen should spread, and close again at coming out, and do the same at meeting any little hills, to examine them on both sides. When they perceive any traces of a party, they should immediately communicate it from one to another, till it comes to the commanding officer.

The advanced guard ought to march slowly, and the commanding officer at the head of the corps should follow at the same rate, so that the rear of the detachment may not be obliged to gallop. As the rear guard H is only established for form, there is no need of its being numerous. The officers and quarter-masters should be careful to keep the men from sleeping, as a horse is easily hurt under the irregular motions of a

sleeping rider, which retards the march. The whole corps should be forbid to smoke or speak, and if any one is obliged to cough or spit, let him cover his mouth so as to make no noise.

When the corps is numerous, the cavalry should march by squadrons, the infantry by platoons, to follow alternately, so that each platoon of infantry FFF, may march at the head of a squadron of cavalry GGG; which disposition will preserve the whole at an equal pace, and keep them readier to form in case of meeting the enemy, or being suddenly attacked, as we are about to mention.

When the advanced guard perceives an enemy at a distance, whether it is day or night, they should not pursue them for fear of falling stupidly into some ambuscade, if it is not in a country that has been well examined; but if they meet them suddenly face to face, as may happen at the entrance of a hollow way I, opening obliquely upon yours, then your advanced guard, without de-

liberating about their strength, should instantly rush upon them. This manoeuvre cannot fail against infantry, and gives a great advantage in a rencounter with cavalry; but if your advanced guard falls back, they expose the whole body to be defeated with them.

When the commanding officer sees the action of his advanced guard, he will instantly turn the infantry on the side of the road most proper to protect them from the enemy's cavalry, and will form them quickly at the side LLL, or on some neighbouring height MM. If it is day, they ought to face the cavalry, stooping down till the instant of the attack, while the first squadron advances to sustain the advanced guard. If the enemy appear desirous to renew the charge, and obstinate in disputing the passage, you may make use of a feint, and by falling back bring them opposite to your infantry, who will have them in flank, and by a well-placed fire put them instantly in disorder. Your cavalry profiting by this,





must immediately face about, and fall upon them with all possible violence, which cannot fail to compleat their defeat.

All villages, hamlets, and houses should be avoided, especially by night, (which is the most common time for the partisan) to avoid being discovered by the barking of dogs, or being seen by peasants who can inform the enemy. You will see equally how dangerous it is to keep the great roads by day, or to cross places that are too open in an enemy's country.

If you cannot avoid passing through a village, it should be done in a hurry, marching confusedly, very close, and filling up the whole breadth, by which you will conceal your strength from the peasants; some officers should remain at coming in, and in the rear, till the whole are passed, taking care that no one stops or withdraws. The same care should be taken at every road that opens upon your route. At the approach of every

place that is covered or hollow, such as house, wood, gully, &c. they should halt till it is well examined, and continue attentive in passing it.

At the passage of defiles, bridges, or fords, the advanced guard should stop at a hundred paces, and form till the whole corps is passed and in order. The antients employed dogs to discover the enemy in ambuscade; but it will be well to distrust such spies, and to suffer none with the corps, as there is nothing more dangerous; their disposition leading them to bark at meeting the least animal, will furnish the enemy with a thousand opportunities of observing you, before you can know where they are.

You should always detain the guides that were taken at setting out; but if necessity requires another, the quartermaster should go and take one without making a noise, and lead him a round about way, that none of the peasants may discover either your party or route. If any of the party discover passengers

in sight of the march, they should be stopped and brought to the corps, and care taken to prevent their escape.

The party should never refresh in a village, but in a wood by day, and open country by night, causing every necessary to be brought them from places in the neighbourhood, which ought to be received from the peasants at a distance, so that they can neither discover the number nor quality of your corps. During the whole time of stopping, you should not be sparing of centries, and have always six horsemen ready to secure any person by whom you imagine you are perceived; when their number becomes considerable, they should be tied together, and great care taken that none escape till the stroke is struck. The officers should be equally attentive that no soldier gets out of sight; and if they meet a deserter from the enemy, he should be conducted immediately to the corps, and then to the army, under the care of a non-commissioned officer.

When necessity obliges you to stop in the neighbourhood of some farm or hamlet, you must take possession of it, and carry off the farmer or chief of the place at going away, threatening to kill him and set his house on fire, if any one stirs from the place before he is released. Every horseman should take care to have a spare fore-shoe, and a peck of oats.

The best season for secret marches, is the cold time of winter when neither peasants nor their dogs stir abroad, and the enemy are quiet, only thinking how to preserve themselves from the cold, which your people get the better of by marching. When you find yourself in the night in some stony place near a post of the enemy, and you are afraid of their hearing the noise of your horses feet, it may be deadened by stretching the mens cloaks on the ground, which was an expedient of great use to Mr. Jeney in Italy.

If an officer of the infantry marches a detachment to relieve a post at a dis-

tance, he should not mount his horse till out of sight of the camp, and should dismount on coming in sight of the post; but if it is only about a league distant from the army, and near the enemy, it is better to go on foot, so as to be less encumbered in case of engaging with any parties of the enemy. The men should not be pressed too much for fear of lagging in the rear, but should march close without stopping, and in as many files as the roads will permit, keeping profound silence, that they may hear any orders that are given.

In a little work attributed to Marshal Saxe, *Traité des Legions ou Memoires sur l' Infanterie*, printed in 1753, it may be seen of what consequence it is for a whole army, or the detachment of an officer, to keep good order; for which reason I shall give the passage. All the armies which the king has sent into Bohemia, Westphalia, and Bavaria, have gone down finely equipped and very compleat; they have returned ruined, exhausted, and

have lost a prodigious number of men and officers; nevertheless we have had no general actions, and the only one which has been any thing considerable, was favourable for us; so it has been in detail that we have seen our armies ruined. In effect, the greatest part of the detachments sent in the course of the war; the detached posts; the escorts which have been attacked by the enemy, have either been beat by surprise, by want of discipline in the soldier, or negligence in the officers. They are yet to learn to march an escort in good order; the soldiers are continually employed in pillaging, or withdrawing from the sight of their officers, or in the constant practice of keeping at a distance from the beginning of the march; and there is scarcely an officer who gives any attention to his duty. It is the same with parties, posts, and detachments, where the soldiers keep at a distance; or if they remain with the party, it is to march in bad order, to stop every moment, to speak

when they are bid to be silent, and murmur when they should obey. If the enemy appears, he neither knows nor hears any thing; they cannot form nor defend themselves; there is nothing but confusion; and if by chance an order is given, which happens but rarely, you speak to the deaf and motionless, little accustomed to military exercises and obedience, or to the respect that is due to officers: they throw away their fire in the air, and of course are beaten, because the soldiers are unacquainted with command, and chastisement is never ready enough with us; but chiefly because young officers do not know how to command, nor to make themselves obeyed; and those who do know, frequently dare not do it, for fear of the hatred of their companions, or believing that punishment will make the soldiers desert.

Such are the sentiments of this great officer, founded on experience and perfect knowledge, which will furnish excellent lessons to those officers who choose

to reflect on it. An officer who marches at the head of a party, ought to keep exact order and profound silence, that they may be in a state to execute whatever he may order for their defence; but in giving his orders, he should take care to do it with a firm and determined countenance, so as to make the soldiers think that he is sure of what he is about, and that nothing better can be done. When the men see their officer hesitating, or varying in his orders, they imagine he does not know what to do, and seeing him disordered, they become so. It is upon such occasions that an officer should be steady to restrain his party, and make them instantly obey. The danger is greater on a march than in an attack; here the soldiers have their arms in their hands, and seeing the enemy before them are ready to engage; it is otherwise on a march, they are less upon their guard, and have not their arms in readiness; then, says Vegetius, an attack confounds them, an ambuscade disorders

them. An officer ought therefore to take every precaution in examining by his advanced guard, all places that may conceal any of the enemy.

As it is difficult, or rather impossible, to examine all the villages where it is necessary to pass, and where the inhabitants are often to be dreaded more than the enemy, an officer had better avoid them if possible, by making a circuit at some distance, and coming to the road afterwards. The most experienced soldiers should be employed to make discoveries, with orders not to stop to drink or amuse themselves, to talk with the peasants, or lose sight of the detachment; but to stop every person that would pass before them, and come quickly to tell the commanding officer what they have perceived.

But as the greatest precaution cannot prevent an officer on a march from being attacked, it is necessary as soon as he perceives the enemy, to observe if the party is superior to his detachment;

whether it consists of cavalry or infantry, or both together. If it is cavalry, and superior, there is no necessity for being discouraged, but on the contrary he should profit by every advantage that offers, by gliding into land that is furrowed, uneven, cut, and difficult or inaccessible to cavalry; or if the country is inclosed, he should line the hedges, and cheer up his soldiers by some encouraging language, while he dispatches a trusty fellow with advice of his situation to the general. If the enemy march up to him in this situation, he must do all that he can to sustain the attack, by ordering his party not to press upon one another, to keep up their fire, and not to discharge their pieces till they are at the muzzles.

Every country presents some natural fortifications which, however despicable they may seem to be, there are brave people who have defended them with extraordinary valour. The Duke de Rohan in his Memoirs makes mention of

seven soldiers in a wretched cottage of earth near Carlat, who stopped the army of the Marshal de Themines for two days, though of seven thousand foot and five hundred horse.

When you have the advantage of rocks or other obstacles to the acting of cavalry, continue the route as near as possible, keeping the party close, and always ready to receive the enemy. If the number of the enemy's cavalry do not exceed your party, you may continue your route, and keeping your men close together and prepared, they will not venture to attack you. If the men could be depended on, and you could scatter them so as to leave no particular object for a body of cavalry to charge, they would have a still greater advantage; but this manoeuvre is only for a small detachment, and would require particular instruction for the execution of it, which is impracticable with an occasional detachment.

If an officer sees no means of posses-

sing an advantageous post, or of getting to the post he was detached to, he can do nothing better than to retreat to the camp, along some river or wood to prevent being broken; but if he is so closely pursued that he cannot avoid being beat or taken, there is no better manoeuvre to imitate than that of the *Barbets* *; who scatter themselves, and retire from tree to tree, from rock to rock, and destroy a party, who can neither beat them, nor take one of them.

The moment of taking possession of a post is the most critical that a detachment can have; officers have been frequently attacked at the very time they thought they had nothing to do, but quietly take the necessary measures for remaining in safety.

If the party which arrives at a post is to relieve another, the officer that is to

* They are peasants subject to the king of Sardinia, who abandon their dwellings when the enemy take possession, and are formed into bodies to defend the Alps which are in his dominions.

be relieved gets under arms as soon as his centries give notice of the approach of the relief. The detachment being known, they are permitted to enter and occupy the post in the room of those that are to depart; at the same time, the corporals go to relieve the centries, and the officers and serjeants give the counter-sign, with the detail of all that is to be done at the post by day or night. He ought likewise to get information from the officer he relieves, if the enemy make incursions in the neighbourhood; if their guards are distant, whether cavalry or infantry, and whereabouts placed. After these precautions, let him guard against his post being surpris'd.

The centries being relieved, the officer that is to go out must form his detachment, and return to camp with the same precautions as in coming. The new detachment remain under arms till the other is gone fifty paces, then the officer is to make them lay down their arms against the parapet, putting their havre-

sacks against the gun-locks, to prevent dust from spoiling them, or the dew of the night from wetting the powder. In an open country without fortification, the men must not go to any distance from their arms when they lay them down in the day, and keep them between their knees when they sit round their fires in the night, with the locks inward, to prevent accidents.

C H A P. X.

Of Reconnoitring.

PARTIES ordered to reconnoitre, are to observe the country or the enemy; to remark the routes, conveniences and inconveniences of the first; the position, march, or forces of the second. In either case, they should have an expert geographer, capable of taking plans readily: he should be the best mounted of the whole, in case the enemy happen to scatter the escort, that he may save himself more easily with his works and ideas.

All parties that go for reconnoitring only, ought to be but few in number. I would never choose more than twelve or twenty men. An officer, be his rank what it will, cannot decline going with so few people under his orders; the honour is amply made up by the importance of the expedition, frequently of

the most interesting consequence, and the properest to recommend the prudence, bravery, and address of any officer that has the fortune to succeed.

It must be evident that the success of such a commission depends upon secrecy, and that it is impossible to fulfil the intention without keeping out of sight of the enemy. It is incontestible, that a numerous party cannot glide along so imperceptibly as a small handful of men. As these detachments must finish their course quickly, it is necessary that they should consist of cavalry only; but if they are to go far, they may increase each with thirty foot, to remain in ambush about half way, in a wood or covered place, with whom the cavalry can leave their provision they brought with them. As to the precautions necessary to be taken on the march, I refer to the preceding chapter, with this difference, that a party ought to detach only two men on each side the road, observing to keep within view of the commanding officer.

An officer charged to reconnoitre in front, should take his instructions in writing, and set out at such time as to arrive at the place proper for beginning his observations at day-break. Every time that he has occasion to stop, the party should face towards the enemy, and send a non-commissioned officer with two horsemen to run over the neighbouring heights, and closely examine the environs. When near the enemy, avoid stopping in a village.

The officer and geographer who is supposed to be present, should remark every interesting particular. The heights, woods, ponds, morasses, rivulets, rivers, fords, bridges, roads, crossings, difficult and dangerous passages, by-ways, meadows, fields, heaths, gullies, hills and mountains; the distance and strength of villages, hamlets, houses, farms, and mills; what sovereign the country belongs to, and what are its productions.

If the enemy comes in sight, the officer should quickly assemble his party,

though his reconnoitring is not finished, and let him retire to his infantry, if he placed any ; but if not, let him gain some other place that he has chosen for a retreat. After being refreshed, let him go back with the cavalry to finish the reconnoitring ; but if he was obliged to return quite to the post, he should not go back till next day. Mid-day is the time of being least incommoded, as detachments are less frequent at that hour. The commanding officer ought always to avoid coming to blows, even though he thinks himself secure of success, unless he happen to be on his return, and near to his post, so that he foresees the grand guard hearing the firing cannot fail to run to his assistance. If obliged to engage with a party who are cutting off your retreat, and that no other means is left of turning them ; you must risk all without hesitating, by rushing on, and try to save the geographer with the fruits of his commission, especially if the reconnoitring was of importance to the

general of the army, and merits the sacrificing a dozen men, which they can easily retrieve on another occasion.

When they go to have news of the enemy, they ought to approach as near as possible, but cautiously: day-break is not the time proper for such a purpose, because at that time the enemy send their different parties and patrols to make discoveries; you should therefore prevent them by approaching in the night. You may easily reconnoitre their position and extent by their fires, which they never extinguish at the head of the guards and piquets; and you may easily remark if they are about to change their position, by hearing a more than ordinary noise; besides, as it is easy to approach by night, you may discover a number of things by the light of the fires.

The officer and geographer must take care to remark every thing, and let nothing escape their memory; but the best time for the geographer is by day in a mountainous country, where they may

flip along from one mountain to another, from mid-day till three o'clock, which is the most favourable time to shun parties, who seldom stir from the army at that time of the day. They must stop all who pass in sight of the party, and release none till the retreat is secure.

A partisan ought not to neglect to reconnoitre every place round his post for two or three leagues, or farther, if it is possible on the side of the enemy; and for that purpose, employ the method of Mr. Jeney for getting intelligence without approaching, and taking plans and observations, so that if the enemy come to possess the country, you may have every necessary instruction for making approaches to surprise them, without having recourse to the peasants.

During the campaigns that Mr. Jeney made, he often examined the enemy's posts without approaching, in the following manner, which he recommends

as infallible, he having always succeeded.

I suppose myself, says he, with my party at Soest in Westphalia A, [Plate VIII.] and the enemy posted at Bervick B, two leagues from me. To know the situation of this place without stirring from Soest, I take the map of the country, and from Soest as center, I draw a circle whose circumference passes half a league beyond Bervick. I draw a circle of the same size upon a leaf of paper, to make my plan as in Plate VIII. and then place Soest in the center A; and I mark all the villages which I find in the map near the circumference, upon my plan, with the distances and bearings as they are represented in the map, making use of a pencil to mark the places DDD, so as to correct the errors more easily which the map may have led me to make.

Having thus formed my plan, with a scale of two leagues, (which is the distance I suppose Bervick) I go to the burgo-master of the town of Soest, where I

cause some of the most intelligent inhabitants to come, speaking to them freely, and openly induce them to communicate all the information I have occasion for.

The better to conceal my designs, I begin my reconnoitring by Brokhufen, a village distant from the enemy. I ask the distance from Soest to Brokhufen; if they say it is seven quarters of a league, I correct the distance of my plan which made it two leagues: then I inform myself of all that is to be found on the road from Soest to Brokhufen; chappels, houses, woods, fields, orchards, rivers, rivulets, bridges, mills, &c. If they say that at a half league from Soest they pass the village of Hinderking, I mark that place upon my plan. I ask if the road from Soest to Hinderking is crossed by any other roads; if there is any morass or heath; if the road is inclosed, paved, or straight; if there is any bridge to pass, and at what distance. I take care to mark every thing in my plan, forgetting no-

thing, even to mills, bushes, gibbets, gullies, fords, and every thing that can be got from their informations, which will probably be perfect, because one always knows more than another.

I continue my questions from Hinderking to Brokhufen, and advancing by little and little, observe the same method on the roads of the other villages round, marked DDD. In this manner I cannot fail to acquire an entire knowledge of all the places; besides, I find myself imperceptibly instructed in the position of the enemy, by seeing the different routes by which I can approach most secretly.

It is plain that such a plan must be very useful to regulate secret expeditions. It is chiefly useful, not to say necessary, for a commander of a party, who can give more ample and precise instructions to his officers, by accompanying them with a copy of the routes marked out, which they can consult even in the night, if it happens to be clear; by which they will be guarded against being deceived by igno-

rant or treacherous guides, which occasion the mistakes of so many who go unprovided with such helps. This enables me to discern which of the assembly is most capable of being a guide in case of need.

There is still another means to secure a reconnoitring party, which is to compose them of people who speak the language of the enemy, and give them furtouts of the colour of a regiment of the enemy, and cockades the same. This scheme may be carried so far as to line the furtouts with the colour of another regiment of the enemy, provided that by turning the furtouts, they appear to be a different corps, and deceive guards, spies, and peasants, and confound their reports.

An officer who goes to reconnoitre a post which he intends to attack, should set out the beginning of a dark night, and give particular instructions upon the subject to those he takes with him to assist in making discoveries: such as exa-

mining the places by which they pass, to approach the post; sounding with long sticks if there are any traps or covered ditches into which they can tumble; to leave branches of trees with their leaves on, to serve for a mark where they find any, against they come to make the attack; to observe exactly where the sentries are posted, and how many there are of them, and how far distant from one another; to advance even to the ditch of the intrenchment, and sound with a stick or plummet to know the depth of water; to examine if the post is fraised or palisadoed, made with earth or fascines, or covered with masonry; in which last case, they must observe its height, to proportion the ladders accordingly. They ought likewise to know how many men are to defend it; in what they are negligent; if they are near assistance, and have cannon. It is on all these heads you can go and examine yourself, or be informed by the reports of deserters or peasants, so that you may form your scheme of an

attack. If you are only instructed by information of others, be careful how you believe people too readily who may wish to betray you, or come only in hope of a recompence. They should be questioned separately, writing down what they say, and by comparing their informations, judge of what is true or false.



C H A P. XI.

Of the Defence of Posts.

WHEN a partisan has taken every precaution that prudence suggests in reconnoitring a place where he would fix a post, he is to take possession in the following manner. The infantry remain under arms in the middle of the place, the cavalry to patrol without, while the commanding officer escorted by a dozen horsemen goes to examine the environs to make his arrangements; having sent several small detachments before, to cover him in time of reconnoitring.

Having remarked the places proper for his guard, defence, and retreat, as well as the dangerous ones by which the enemy can make approaches secretly to surprise him, he should choose the most convenient in the front of his post to fix his grand guard D, [Plate VII.] which

must face the enemy. He must mark the heights for this guard to place their vedettes EEEE, and regulate the number according to the exigencies of the situation. In a covered country you must not be sparing of them, and must reinforce every guard. At fifty paces before the front of the grand guard, a subaltern or non-commissioned officer with eight horsemen should be always ready to set out at K, to go and reconnoitre, when the vedettes have observed any party.

The grand guard being fixed, you should form another in the middle of the village, called the ordinary guard, composed of cavalry and infantry, placing centries at the entries, and vedettes all round; the last at such distance as to see one another. A piquet should likewise be fixed before the quarters of the commanding officer, which should be near the ordinary guard and the whole corps. In the day, half the cavalry of the picquet must keep their horses bridled and ready to mount, but if the enemy

is near, they must remain on horseback, the other half to unbridle till the hour of relief.

According to the arrangement we have given for composing the corps of a partisan, the grand guard may consist of a captain, a first and second lieutenant, a quarter-master, two serjeants, four corporals, a trumpeter, farrier, and fifty-two private horsemen. The ordinary guard to have cavalry equal to the grand guard, with a captain, a first and second lieutenant of infantry, two serjeants, and sixty men, including four corporals, two lance-corporals, and a drummer: the picquet to consist of the same number of cavalry and infantry as the ordinary guard.

If there is any dangerous place capable of covering the approaches of the enemy in the environs of the post, and out of the circuit of the patrols, there should be a guard placed there, more or less strong according to the importance of the place, and care should be taken to preserve the communication. The

guards and picquets being placed, the detachments that were sent out on the roads must be called in, and then go to work to lodge the party in the gardens that open upon the country, and the commanding officer's quarters; beating down hedges, filling up ditches, and levelling a piece of ground large enough to draw up the whole corps. The horses to be put under cover in barns contiguous to the gardens, but in case there are no barns, they may substitute sheds open on one side, that the horses may go out altogether in case of an alarm.

The officers should occupy the houses in the neighbourhood of the sheds, and one of each company remain day and night with the company, to prevent any of the men from entering the village without leave, upon any pretence. The commanding officer must acquaint the officers of his having chose the place M for the rendezvous in case of a retreat; which ought to be at some distance from the village, and on the side he judges

most convenient for retiring to the army. At sun-set the grand guard to return to the post and join the picquet, the one half of each to mount alternately till day-break, and then the grand guard to return to the place they possessed the day before. The centries and vedettes should be doubled, and all the passages shut up with waggons placed in two rows, except one for fallying out at, in case of a retreat, made wide enough for the passage of the patroles, or the whole cavalry.

The corporals of the ordinary guard should lead the relief of the vedettes every hour, setting off together, but when they come to the passage of the post A, [Plate VII.] they must separate into two parties, the one to the right to relieve the vedettes BBB, the other to the left for the vedettes CCC, then each of them with the parties they have relieved should go on at their head a quarter of a league, by the two routes pointed out in the plan, to examine the environs, supposing

an hour to each. Besides this reconnoitring, the captain of the grand guard should send two patrols in the night. To fill up the intervals, they should set out about half an hour after the corporals, and make the same round. At returning to the post, the corporals to make their report to the officer of the ordinary guard; the conductors of the patrols to the captain of the grand guard.

A little before sun-rise or sun-set, a grand patrol detached from the corps should be sent under the conduct of an officer to search the whole environs of the post minutely, especially the dangerous places, because at these times the enemy are most likely to attempt a surprise. If the patrols discover them, they will be in a state to repulse them, or at least to harass them till the commanding officer, upon the first notice, draws up the whole corps. The officers should take great care to instruct the centries in their duty, explaining it to them every time of their mounting, and forbid

them to smoke, as the least fire can be easily perceived in the dark, and serve to direct the approaches of the enemy. No centry to move more than fifty paces to the right, and as many to the left of his post, and let the weather be never so bad, he must not get under cover. No one to be allowed to go out of the post without leave of the commanding officer, and to prevent desertion or marauding, the centries and vedettes must be charged to let no soldier pass.

The vedettes must stop all passengers, and take them to the next centry, who must call a corporal to conduct them to the commanding officer. If there are a great number passing at once, the vedette at the challenge must hasten to stop them at a hundred paces, till the officer has sent to reconnoitre them, but if he finds them to be a party of the enemy, he must fire upon them and retire. At the first alarm, the grand guard and picquet ought to mount, and each of them to detach a subaltern officer immediately at

the head of the best mounted horsemen, to go quickly to encounter the enemy. The rest of the grand guard and cavalry of the picquet to follow immediately, led by their captains to sustain the first detachments, to repulse or keep back the enemy as long as it is possible, and give time to the commanding officer to form the whole corps.

If the commanding officer observes that the enemy are of no very extraordinary force, he must without hesitating put himself at the head of his cavalry, and instantly charge them, pouring upon them with his whole force, which is the best way to succeed; and in the mean time, the infantry should form to sustain the cavalry. One essential circumstance should not be forgot here, which is, that at the going of the detachments of the grand guard and picquet, all the infantry of the picquet should march immediately to the place appointed for the rendezvous in case of a retreat, and a strong detachment of cavalry should fol-

low to occupy the place. If it is at the entrance of a wood or some covered place which the enemy may occupy, and thereby cut off your retreat, you must prevent it by fixing the infantry of the picquet in the post, to remain day and night, with a lieutenant at the head of twenty horsemen to clear round it. If the enemy is too superior, and appears to form an attack on that side, the commanding officer should get there before with all his force to oppose them, till all his detachments join, and then regulate his retreat, as will be seen in the chapter of the Retreat.

To be better secured in a post which you expect to remain in for some time, and where you find that the enemy will not fail to disturb you, it will be proper immediately to employ some of your people with the peasants, to form some intrenchments in a hurry in the most dangerous places, to have breast-works of felled trees in the woods; herres placed in the fords; pits dug at the entries

and plains without defence; so that the cavalry coming full speed to charge you, may tumble in. If there happen to be a bridge either in the front or on the flanks of the post as at N, by which the enemy can facilitate their approach or retreat, it must be instantly destroyed, unless you find it may be of use, and necessary to fix a good guard on it.

To regulate the attack and defence most advantageously, you should take care to observe the places by which the enemy can approach, and form a plan of operations for cutting off, or taking in flank the different routes which he can attempt. You should inform your officers, and not fail to hearken to the advice of those, whose talents, genius, and experience, render them competent judges of your designs. These arrangements will be of great use in surprising the enemy's parties, who will come from time to time to reconnoitre the post. If the enemy approaches in the night, take care how you attack him; you cannot

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reconnoitre his force, and you ought to suppose that he is informed of yours.

Do not suffer any suspected woman to approach the soldiers; their visits are dangerous in debauching your people, and the enemy frequently employ them to discover your strength. Let no deserter stop in your post, and if he comes in the night, keep him till day-break is near, and then send him to the army. Every party that approaches your post will profess belonging to you, but if they are not provided with a proper passport from the general, or if you do not know any of the officers, trust neither to their word nor uniform; desire them politely to return the way they came, telling them, that if they do not, you will treat them as enemies, and take care that your party remain under arms, till they are out of sight of all your guards. This conduct will make other detachments attentive. The commanding officer must oblige all the officers to remain near their command, and to regulate their meals

so as to have a part to observe the men, while the others are at table.

A true partisan is well convinced that he cannot be too cautious of the schemes of the enemy, who frequently cause false alarms, to lead you to relax in your care, and into deceitful security, of which you sooner or later become the dupe. I am by no means of their opinion who despise false alarms, and who to spare their people are so infatuated as not to take arms till they are sure of the coming of the enemy: on the contrary, I think myself authorized by experience to insist on preparing at the least noise of the vedettes. Even if it is another party of your army approaching your post, as soon as you are acquainted with it, you ought to reconnoitre them, and follow or receive them with all the attention which war requires. I am very far from fearing that the service, such as I have directed for the safety of a post, can fatigue a corps too much; so far from it, it will contribute much to harden them

against fatigue, augment their courage, vigilance, and address; while inaction benumbs the body, fatigues the mind, and softens the heart.

When a partisan has taken all the precautions which I have mentioned, he may reckon himself secure of never being surpris'd. If in a country the most exposed, or the most covered, by executing every point of the service as has been mentioned, the enemy cannot approach your post nearer than a quarter of a league without your being informed by the noise of the vedettes and patroles, who cover your post day and night more than a quarter of a league round, which is sufficient to guard against surprise, five minutes being sufficient to form, and ten being still left to deliberate upon the part that is to be taken, whether to attack, defend, or retire.

When a partisan happens to establish his post in an enemy's country, it is then his duty to take care of the subsistence of his corps, and to take every proper

measure to provide his people with necessaries: for which reason he should send some parties as far as possible towards the enemy, to summon the chiefs of the villages to deliver forage and provisions in proportion to their abilities, taking care to be sparing of the nearest places, and more particularly of the post itself, which ought not to be touched but in the greatest extremity. A partisan cannot be too diligent in giving the general an account of his position, projects, success, and all his operations, and therefore will take care to preserve his communication with the army.

These instructions may serve for the corps of a partisan according to the proposed arrangements, but partisans of less force must regulate their precautions according to their strength; and detachments of thirty, fifty, or a hundred men, will seek to post themselves in redoubts proportioned to their number, or in mills, farms, hamlets, detached houses, churches, church-yards, &c. observing that the

more a post is extended, the more care and fatigue it requires.

The principal object for an officer that is detached, says Monsieur Vauban, is to foresee every troublesome event. The want of exactness, and the smallest relaxation in the service of out-posts, may have the most fatal consequences; and history furnishes a thousand examples of camps being surpris'd, and armies cut in pieces, by the negligence of detachments that ought to have watched for their preservation.

The manner of relieving detached posts has been mentioned; but if an officer is detached to a mill or house, let him draw up his party about fifteen or twenty paces from the post, and send a serjeant or corporal with five or six men to search the chambers, cellars, and barns; which being done, the centries must be placed; the post taken possession of; the arms ranged, so that every one can find his own without confusion; the inhabitants lodged in some other house: and

then intrench himself according to the rules given.

If an officer is to fix in a village where it is difficult to examine every place where the enemy may lie in ambush, he should send for the magistrates to come and speak with him, while his party remain drawn up at the end of the village, that they may declare if they know whether there are any of the enemy's parties, suspected persons, or concealed arms in the place; which being done, the centries to be placed, the party to take possession, putting small detachments of five or six men, more or less, according to the strength of the party, at the avenues; and examining the church, or any detached house, to make the principal post in case the advanced posts are forced. The men best acquainted with the duty should be planted on the most exposed and distant places, so as to see all the approaches; and sometimes in trees, that they may see at a distance, and remain concealed from the enemy.

If he finds any place near him where the enemy can lie concealed, he should place a corporal with six or seven men there, with orders to fall back upon his post if attacked, or remain till they find themselves disengaged. The soldiers of this lesser post should take care to make no fires, because it would serve for a guide to the enemy to avoid them when they want to fall upon the principal post; but fires may be lighted in the places where they have no guards, to make the enemy think they have them every where, at the same time placing soldiers in ambush where there are none lighted. This scheme may serve for all posts in a level country, where two or three soldiers should be kept going all night to stir up the fires.

The exterior arrangements being made, and centries placed on the avenues, bridges, and steeples, the works for fortifying the post should be marked out, and executed by the workmen, and the magistrates ordered to send straw to the

nearest houses for lodging the soldiers, who must never absent themselves. The officer must always be in readiness to go where his presence may be wanted, and make his serjeants and corporals frequently go the rounds.

Monfieur Vauban says, that if an officer is to remain but four hours in a post, he ought to intrench; and he should cause the works which are to be constructed to be well executed, so as to defend every place where the enemy can come. Monfieur Folard gives an excellent maxim, to attack an imaginary post, that we may be able to defend a real one. And the Baron de Travers says, that with regard to the strength and means of resistance in posts, they should be in proportion to the force the enemy can bring against them. If to pass only some hours in a post, it is a good way to make a parapet of felled trees; or if it is in a village, to intrench a detached house.

The way to guard against being sur-

prised, betrayed, or made prisoner, is to take precautions against all that the enemy can undertake, and whatever distance he may be at, we ought not to found our security on probabilities, but extend them even to possibilities. Neither stranger nor soldier of any other party should be admitted into the post, and the roll called three or four times a day, that the men may not absent themselves; he should likewise examine the centries, to see whether they are acquainted with the detail of their duty, and should shew them how to defend themselves in case of being attacked; observing to them, that if the enemy make such a manoeuvre, they should oppose such another; if they try this scheme, to resist with that, and deceive them at every step. He may make some of them try to scale the intrenchment, to shew the difficulty of mounting it; and by exercising them in this manner, he will easily prepare them to resist the enemy; it will flatter their vanity, and give them a confidence in

him ; but let him take care not to be too familiar, lest in a brisk attack, he orders something not to their mind, when, instead of obeying, they will resist his orders, and mutiny : but when he has shewn his foldiers the advantage of a party that are intrenched, over those who are exposed in the attack, he must take care to preserve subordination, and not allow himself to fall into the snares of the enemy.

An hour or two before day, the men should be kept alert, sitting on the banquette near their arms ; and the patroles sent at that time, rather than in the night, to march slowly, to listen attentively, and examine every place round the post where a man can conceal himself.

It happens frequently that two armies are encamped opposite to one another, and have several posts on the same line, and two patroles meet in the night. As it is impossible to distinguish whether they are friends or enemies, they who

first discover the others, should conceal themselves on the sides of the road, behind bushes, or in a ditch, to examine if they are stronger, and in that case to let them pass in silence, and return another way to the post to tell what they have seen; but if they find them weaker, he who commands the patrol should make the signal which is ordered for the patrols of the night, which is commonly a stroke or two on the cartouch-box or butt end of the firelock, which is answered by an appointed number; but I would recommend a word as the safest. If the patrol does not answer, they should advance upon them with fixed bayonets, fire upon them if they see them retiring, and make them surrender. In the war of 1745 in Italy, there were old soldiers who used to beg for this employment, and took pleasure in it.

If detached opposite to the enemy, it is to be presumed that you may be attacked; therefore small detachments should be advanced between the cen-

tries in the night, about thirty or forty paces from the post, with their bellies on the ground, in these places where they imagine the enemy may come; with orders to those who command these detachments, to make a soldier reconnoitre any parties that are seen, so as not to confound their own patrols with the enemy's parties, and to retire to the post on the first firing.

In villages there should be great care taken of suspected persons, or of the peasants revolting; and for this purpose, you should make the magistrates order two peasants the best known in the place, to be put on duty with the centries of the party, at the passages left in intrenching. These peasants, whom the magistrates must cause to be relieved every two hours, should be charged to recollect all who pass out or in of the village; and both one and the other must be told, that they shall be answerable for all the accidents that may happen from the treachery or negligence of these centries

who have let enemies in disguise enter the village.

They must likewise order the soldiers who guard the intrenchments, to let no peasant approach, and to shut up the passages with two trees across in the night, and not to open them till day, except for the passing of the patrols. They must examine with iron spits, or their swords, all carts that pass loaded with hay, straw, or casks, or any thing that can conceal men, arms, or ammunition.

The inhabitants should be prevented from making processions, holding fairs or markets; because under favour of these assemblies, the enemy often enter and seize posts. Polybius gives a lesson that will not be misplaced here. There are hundreds of proofs how fatal these indulgences have been, says the translator, yet still they remain uncorrected; truly it is wrong that man should pass for the most artful of all animals, since there is no one so easy to surprise; how many camps, garrisons, and posts have

been surpris'd by giving this liberty, and it is a misfortune that has happened to numbers; yet these surprises are always new. An officer cannot watch too carefully to prevent schemes that may be contriv'd against him; and the attempt on Brisac, in the month of November, 1704, is so much to the purpose, that it ought not to be pass'd in silence. The governor of Fribourg having formed the design of surprising Brisac, set out in the night of the 9th or 10th of November, with two thousand men, and a great number of waggons loaded with arms, grenades, pitch, &c. and some chosen soldiers: all these waggons were drove by officers disguis'd like waggoners, and were covered with perches, which had hay plac'd over them, so that they appear'd like waggons loaded with hay coming in contribution. They arriv'd at the new gate by eight o'clock in the morning, under the favour of a thick fog: three waggons enter'd the town, two full of men, and one with arms,

when an Irishman, an overseer of workmen, observing thirty men near the gate, who, though they had the dress, had not the manner of peasants; he asked them what they were, and why they did not go to work like other people. Upon their not answering, and appearing confounded, he struck some of them with his cane; upon which the disguised officers run to the arms which were in the waggon next them, and fired fifteen or twenty shot at him within half a dozen paces, without wounding him. The Irishman leaped into the ditch, where they likewise fired several useless shot at him, while he called *To arms, to arms*, with all his might.

At this noise, the guards of the half-moon and the gate run to arms, and would have pulled up the drawbridge, but were prevented by the waggons which the enemy had placed upon it. The officers and soldiers who were in the waggons, rushed out with their arms, and having joined the rest, attacked the

guard commanded by a captain of grenadiers ; but being repulsed, and five of them killed, the rest were dismayed, and fled either into the town, or out into the country. The captain of the guard made the first gate, which was a grate, to be shut, across which the enemy, who were upon the bridge, fired at all who appeared ; and having left the half of his guard, he mounted the rampart with the other half, and continued firing upon the enemy. A lieutenant who commanded twelve men of the advanced guard, was attacked at the same time by an officer who presented a pistol to his breast ; but snatching it from him, he fired it at him, and killed him : this lieutenant defended himself to the end of the action ; but having received several wounds, he died that day.

Upon hearing the noise of the surprise, the commanding officer of the place distributed his garrison to their proper posts ; and having made every disposition necessary for his defence, the enemy saw

that their design had failed, and retired in disorder, leaving a number of wag-gons behind them, and more than forty foldiers who were killed or wounded. Such was the enterprize on Brifac, which failed by a trifling accident.

Another example will prove how necessary it is for officers in detached posts to take every precaution. Captain Vedel being detached to a village, where the curate of the parish had obtained leave from the commanding officer in the country to make a procession of the Penitents of a neighbouring convent to a chapel in the village which he named, alledging that it was an annual custom; but Captain Vedel astonished to see such a numerous procession composed of the peasants, called to arms, and having drawn up his party of fifty men, disconcerted their scheme; many of the penitents whom he stopped, were found armed with pistols and swords, with which he acquainted the commanding officer, who immediately caused the curate and

several of the penitents to be hanged.

This example, and many others which might be cited, shew that an officer who commands in a post cannot be too much on his guard to prevent his falling into the snares which the enemy prepare for him, as the seizing of a post, of however little importance it may seem, may be attended with the most troublesome consequences.

Henry IV. of France lost Amiens in Picardy by a waggoner letting fall a sack of nuts as if by accident, and when the soldiers of the guard were picking them up, the Spaniards, who had disguised themselves like peasants on purpose, rushed out of a house near the gate where they had been in ambush, put them to the sword, and carried the town.

These instances, with many that could be mentioned, shew that we cannot be too distrustful of the numberless ways there are of being surpris'd. If peasants come to visit their friends or relations in the village, the centries should stop them,

and acquaint their officer, who should not allow them to enter till the magistrates, curate, or responsible inhabitants answer for them ; and this permission to be granted only on working days, and not on Sundays or festivals, on account of their being unemployed these days.

In an enemy's country, the inhabitants are always ready to revolt and betray ; therefore the commanding officer ought to take one or two of the magistrates children, or three or four of the most considerable families of the village, and keep them in the principal post as a pledge of the fidelity of the inhabitants. The children (to whom they should take care to do no manner of hurt) should only be kept half a day each, and changed for some others. The commanding officer should forbid the inhabitants to assemble in taverns or public walks, or any place whatever, and cause these orders to be fixed up at the door of the church. If they are seen to stop and converse at coming out of church, or in the

market-place, let the patrols oblige them to retire. The tavern-keepers, and all the inhabitants must be forbid to receive any stranger without acquainting the commanding officer. None to be permitted to stir abroad after retreat beating on pain of being killed by the centries who see them, or stopped and conducted to dungeons by the patrols, who ought to march slowly; stop from time to time to hearken if they hear any noise; go over all the quarters that are marked out to them, and give an account of any thing they have discovered that can cause any alarm in the post.

If fire breaks out any where, or the inhabitants quarrelling among themselves, an officer should take care how he sends a party to their assistance, because these are frequently snares of the enemy to divide the strength of a detachment on purpose to attack them; he should therefore ring the alarm bell, make all the different posts get under arms, and order those who command

them, to make the soldiers remain armed against the parapet, so as to observe what passes without the village. The soldiers of the principal post should likewise get under arms, and the officer detach four or five men with a serjeant or corporal to part the fray, or set the inhabitants to work in extinguishing the fire.

As all the necessary precautions for the safety of a post are too many to have them executed by giving them verbally, the commanding officer should give his orders in writing, and have them fixed up in all the lesser posts. One thing to which officers who are detached to a village should give particular attention, is, not to vex the inhabitants by making them furnish too much: whatever they are allowed by the general to exact, such as firing, forage, candle, &c. for the guards, should be demanded in proportion to the abilities of the inhabitants; and an officer cannot be too delicate in preserving the character of a gentleman in ordering con-

tributions, and preserving the inhabitants from being robbed, or treated ill by the soldiers; they have every thing to apprehend from people that are soured; and what despair will they not be drove to, who see their country ravaged, their effects pillaged, themselves beaten and treated like slaves? I shall not say that humanity cries out against such rigorous treatment, because it is but too common to see war silencing the laws of humanity; but I shall say that it has been seen, that not only small detachments, but even numerous garrisons have had their throats cut, or been driven out of the towns they defended, by the inhabitants whom they had reduced to despair.

History furnishes many examples of this sort, but none that will afford a lesson more fit for military men to reflect on than the affair of Genoa. On the 5th of December, 1745, when the Austrian army had possession of Genoa, an Austrian officer struck one of the Genoese with

his cane, for refusing to assist in dragging a mortar, or interrupting it, upon which the Genoese tore out his bowels with a knife; the uproar became general, the inhabitants run to the arsenal, broke open the gates, took out arms, and repulsed the Austrians from street to street, and drove them out of the city, after having killed more than five thousand men.

It is not sufficient for the preservation of a post, to raise intrenchments, nor to take every precaution against being surprised. As the enemy must attack with a superior force, your dispositions must be made in such a manner as not to confuse one another, and every one being properly placed, contributes to the common safety.

If it is a redoubt, or other intrenchment of earth that is to be defended, seven or eight trees with their branches, should be kept in reserve, to throw into the breaches the enemy may make, and the parapet kept well lined with men, who ought not to fire till the enemy are

on the glacis. Grenades have unaccountably funk into difufe; but I am perfuaded there is nothing more proper than to have grenades to throw in the midft of the enemy who have jumped into the ditch, nay even afhes or quick-lime, whose burning duft cannot fail to blind the enemy, fhould be had if poffible; and however extraordinary it may appear, Monfieur Le Cointe pretends, after feveral trials, to answer for the fuccefs of the lime. If the ftrength of your detachment will admit of it, eight or ten foldiers fhould be placed in the ditch, (on the oppofite fide from the enemy) fo divided as to take the enemy on the flanks, who have jumped into the ditch. This kind of fally, by running round upon the right and left at the fame time, muft astonish an enemy who could not dream of being attacked.

If there are heights from whence the enemy can crush your people with ftones, they muft be occupied with eight or ten men covered with a breast-work, to pre-

vent the enemy from possessing them, or guard against them, as has been directed in Chap. III.

In the defence of houses, mills, &c. as well as regular fortifications, the men should be made acquainted with the different manoeuvres they may employ for their defence, without which they do not foresee the intentions of their officer, and may counteract one another by their being in disorder.

The obstinate defence of a post is the action where an officer detached singly can acquire the greatest glory; the resistance not proceeding from the number of soldiers destined to defend it, but from the talents of the officer who commands. It is in him that the strength of the intrenchment lies; and if he joins to determined bravery, the abilities necessary on these occasions, and can persuade his soldiers that the lot the enemy prepares for them, is a thousand times worse than death, he may be said in some sort to have rendered his post impregnable.

When an officer who is posted in a redoubt, is attacked by the enemy, he needs not to be employed in firing himself, but in seeing that the soldiers do their duty, and do not throw away their fire in the air. If he sees their ardor slacken in the rage of the attack, he must encourage them; if he sees the enemy making greater progress on one side than the other, he must weaken one to support the other: this movement may be dangerous, and it were better to have a small reserve in case of need; but an officer with a small detachment that can scarcely line the parapet, cannot spare men for a reserve, but must employ every means they have been preparing for their defence, as directed above.

In the defence of detached buildings, there are so many different retreats, that it becomes an arduous task to succeed, when brave people are to defend them. They have the loop-holes on the ground floor to defend, when beat from the intrenchments without, and may resist

great numbers by retiring gradually to the different floors of the house, where they should have large buckets of water provided to throw upon the enemy, which though it may appear trifling, is one of the most disagreeable that can be opposed to the assailants; for at the same time that it wets their powder, arms, and cloaths, it hinders them from seeing what is doing above; prevents every scheme for setting fire to the house, and may oblige them to desist from the attack.

The Chevalier Folard in 1705 had a small country house near Brescia to defend with four companies of grenadiers against the chosen troops of Prince Eugene's army, who were obliged to retire after penetrating into the court.

The prince of Wirtemberg, says Monsieur Folard, believing that there were succours coming to us, imagined that if he could get possession of a pigeon-house, from whence a very hot fire was kept up, the post would soon surrender; he

therefore caused it to be attacked, and our soldiers having taken away the door to light a fire within, the officer who commanded below being wounded, and not able to resist the firing which was levelled through the door-way, was made prisoner. There were seven grenadiers on the top of the pigeon-house, who were summoned to surrender, but who thought themselves too well posted to submit so soon; they therefore replied that they would not yield till the pears were ripe, as they were capable enough of holding their post; and accordingly kept a constant fire upon the enemy, till the prince of Wirtenberg retired and left the place covered with dead.

The Chevalier Clairac mentions an affair which happened to him in 1742, no less worthy the attention of young officers. When he was travelling with some people in the upper palatinate of Bavaria, he perceived that he was followed by a party of hussars and pandours who might attack him. Having exami-

ned the different avenues of the village of Vurz where he was, he blocked them up with trunks of trees, ladders, and waggons with one or two wheels taken off each of them: he likewise raised a banquette along the wall of the church-yard, where he placed his domestics and the people who followed him; looking upon the church, which he had pierced with loop-holes, as his citadel, and the steeple as his last retreat. Two houses almost touched this inclosure, and being built on low ground, the top of the wall was not higher than that which served him for a parapet; he would not open these houses, but to preserve a communication, prevent being plunged down upon by the enemy's fire, and to secure his flanks, he made a sort of bridge from the top of his intrenchment to the roofs of the houses, and having barricadoed the doors and windows of the ground-floors, he fixed his guards, but these precautions were useless, for the hussars tired with watching him, fell back up-

on their army, and Monsieur Clairac pursued his journey to Tirz-chen-raït.

These examples shew what resources men of genius can find in their courage, and to what length the defence of an intrenched house may be carried by people of determined bravery.

As I have recommended the having stones in heaps to throw from the walls upon the enemy, and have alledged that the defence of a post does not depend upon the soldiers who are destined for that service, but upon the officer who commands, I shall give the following example in proof of my opinion.

In the month of September 1761, Captain-lieutenant Alexander Campbell of the 88th regiment with 100 men under his command, was pitched on to defend the remarkable post near Cassel in Hesse, called the Hercules. Monsieur Roziere the celebrated partizan and engineer of Marshal Broglie's army, with six hundred infantry and four squadrons of cavalry, arrived in the neighbourhood

of the post the morning of the 22d, and having beat a parley, surrounded and carried off the two men who were sent out to receive the message. After having examined them separately, he caused a detachment, under cover of his musquetry from a hill that was opposite to the principal passage, to advance and mount the stair, three men abreast, which they did so slowly and without any interruption, that the whole stair of about a hundred steps was full of men, when Captain Campbell, (who had made an excellent disposition for the defence of all the parts of his post) having some chosen men at each side of him, waited to receive those who advanced first upon their bayonets, and firing at the same time, gave the signal for the rest to throw over large stones which he had collected and disposed for that purpose; which made such havoc, that Monsieur Roziere, startled at the unexpected reception, and despairing of success, wished to get his party off. Captain Campbell seeing the

destruction of the enemy without a man of his being hurt, and that he could renew the reception as often as they chose to repeat the attempt, was elated with his success and encouraging his men, when he happened to move from the wall that covered him, and received a musquet shot from the opposite hill, which entered a little below the left temple and came out at the same distance below the right, upon which he fell, and the party beat the chamade and surrendered. After two hours possession the French retired, carrying off the prisoners and leaving Captain Campbell, whom they thought dead, to be saved by our troops who soon took possession again, and sent him to be recovered, and to display new merits in his profession.

Vegetius very particularly recommends the collecting of stones to throw over the walls, and I am certain that nothing better can be done against an escalade; though they should have some long forked sticks to pass through the loop-

holes and overfet the ladders, while they ſhower down tiles, ſlates, ſtones, aſhes, and lime, as well as the rafters from above.

If the enemy take cannon to force the poſt, I do not ſee how it can be reſiſted, unleſs the houſe is low, and they cannot range round the intrenchments, as every ſhot can make a large opening in bad built houſes, and may cruſh the beſieged. The only means then to ſhun being maſſacred is to capitulate, or to ruſh out briskly upon the enemy when they leaſt expect it. The firſt is not reſolved upon but when the honours of war can be obtained, which is to march out with drums beating to return to the army with a proper eſcort. But if this capitulation cannot be obtained, the beſieged have nothing left conſiſtent with true bravery, but to ruſh out ſword in hand, and cut their way through the enemy. The neceſſity of conquering changes the brave man into the determined ſoldier, which gives him the means of retir-

ing to the army or some neighbouring post.

It was by a manoeuvre of this kind, that Marshal Saxe saved himself at Chrachnitz a village in Poland, where a party of eight hundred horse had a design to carry him off with eighteen men that were his attendants. The prince, after having resisted a long time in the chambers of the inn where he was, and seeing he could hold out no longer, rushed out upon them in the night sword in hand, fell upon one of the guard who did not expect it, run him through the body, and retired to Sandomir where he had a Saxon garrison.

If a post is to be abandoned when it can be no longer held, and you are going to make the sally, you should continue to fire with spirit, taking away the barricadoes from the door through which you are to pass with as little noise as possible. When they are assembled, the whole party should go out close together, rushing with their bayonets to the place

the officer thinks the least guarded. You ought never, says Mr. Folard, to wait for day to execute these sallies which cannot succeed but in a dark night, by which you easily conceal from the enemy the road you have taken, for which reason you should not fire, but open to yourselves a passage sword in hand, lest the enemy come where they hear the noise.

The Baron de Travers says, that not to be met by the enemy we should take the contrary way to that he expects us to take, and which it appears we ought to take: a small party can hide themselves every where, and as it is not common to search places on the enemy's side, there they are most secure, and may pass the day, to take another road under favour of the night.

Officers should be attentive to distinguish between the true and false attacks, and not despair when beat from their first intrenchments. The defence of posts are so easy, that I am surpris'd they do

not hold out longer than they commonly do. There wants only resolution and vigilance, taking every advantage of the ground, and persuading the soldiers that nothing but the most manifest baseness can let the enemy penetrate. The example of Cremona, surpris'd by Prince Eugene in 1702, will remain a proof to posterity of what determined bravery can do; and shew, that though an enemy is master of half the ramparts, and part of the town, he is not master of the whole.

Prince Eugene having formed the design of surprising this town, which was defended by a garrison of French and Irish, got some thousand Austrian soldiers admitted at a secret passage by a priest. These troops seized the two gates, and a great part of the town; the garrison buried in sleep were waked by the assault, and obliged to fight in their shirts; but by the excellent manoeuvres of the officers, and resolute bravery of the men, they repulsed the Imperialists from square

to square, from street to street, and obliged Prince Eugene to abandon the part of the town and ramparts of which he had been in possession.

What then can be the reason they do not defend posts and villages as well now-a-days, especially when they have secured a retreat fit for making a good defence, or obtaining an honourable capitulation? It seems to proceed from their not applying enough to know the causes of the misfortunes they fall into, and being unacquainted with what has happened to those who have gone before. The people who attack, have nothing supernatural in them, and are not different from those who are attacked.

They may judge from what I have said, that nothing is more easy; and the officer who is determined and jealous of his reputation, who has learnt from study to make use of his talents, may, like LEONIDAS, defend the pass of Thermopylae with three hundred men against a whole army, and choose rather (as a mo-

dern philosopher says) to perish nobly, than be guilty of cowardice. In every post, he can supply the want of force by stratagems.

Posts have often resisted the first and greatest efforts of the assailants, and have yielded or been abandoned to subsequent attacks, though much less spirited. How comes this? It is owing to an officer's not daring to abandon his post at the first attack: he repulses the enemy, because if forced, they will be put to the sword with their whole party; but when the enemy comes back, he thinks he has nothing to reproach himself with, having defended it for some time, so retires, or surrenders. Since he could repulse the enemy when in good order and quite fresh, how much more easy and less to be dreaded when they return harassed with fatigue.

Is not the great cause of misconduct among military men, the want of encouragement to excite emulation? An officer who is not protected, who is ne-

ver sure of the least favour, neglects himself, and takes less trouble to acquire glory, rarely heard of, though merited by the bravest actions, than to enjoy the tranquillity of an ordinary reputation.

It is not expected that an officer who is placed in a post, should seek to engage; but that he should steadily resist when he is pressed, and die rather than abandon his intrenchment.

Historians have been very silent about posts being well defended, though the lessons to be drawn from them may be more generally instructive, and as agreeable to read, as those left us of the best fortified places of a state. We are astonished at the account of a hundred thousand men perishing before Ostend in 1604, and their general, the Archduke Albert, with the ruins of his army, not making himself master of it, till after a three years siege: nor is our wonder less to see Charles the XII. of Sweden in the year 1713, with seven or eight officers and some domestics, defend himself in a

house of wood near Bender, against twenty thousand Turks and Tartars.

Several historians mention the defence of this house because it was done by a crowned head; but brave actions, whoever are the authors, should never be buried in oblivion, as they excite emulation, and are full of instruction.

C H A P. XII.

Of the Attack of Posts.

THOUGH the taking of a post is always difficult when you have to do with people who know how to defend it; nevertheless, you may succeed in attacking them by surprise and stratagem. We ought never to form a scheme for an attack upon simple speculation, because from reasoning we often think things are feasible, which we find impossible in the execution. When you intend to undertake an action of this kind, you ought to form a just idea of it, by examining all the branches separately, and the different means you can use, so that by comparing them together, you may see if they concur, and answer to the general purpose; and lastly, you are to take such measures as may in a manner render you certain of success before you begin.

As it is not the practice of the army to choose a particular officer for the attack of an intrenched post if he does not offer himself, so an officer should not embark in such an enterprise, without having examined the means of succeeding, and being capable of shewing the general a plan of what he has projected, to see if he will consent to the execution of it. If the general approves the plan, he must beg leave to go to reconnoitre the post with a man or two, that he may take his measures more justly for the execution of it. I say that he ought to ask permission to go and reconnoitre the post, that he may be owned and claimed in case he is taken prisoner.

When he has been to reconnoitre, as is directed in Chap. X. and has got every necessary information, he should go to give the general an account of his discoveries, receive his last orders for the attack; for the soldiers of his party, and for those who are to march to sustain him.

The choice of men that are to go upon the attack of a post, is so much the more essential, as the success of the enterprise depends on it. None but volunteers of determined bravery ought to be taken, men who are not stupid, and have no colds upon them; because he who does not attend to the orders of his officer, runs on with blind zeal; and he who coughs or spits, may discover the party to the enemy's centries, and cause the best concerted scheme to fail. As to those who are to support them, they may be taken according to their rank in the guard or detachment, as the general judges proper.

The disposition for an attack must depend on the discoveries that are made, so as not to be obliged to return in the midst of the execution. The men being chosen, they must be inspected, to see that nothing is wanted which can contribute to their success; because, if the post is fortified with an intrenchment of earth or fascines, the two first ranks

should be provided with spades and pick-axes beside their arms; if fraised or palissadoed, they must likewise have hatchets; and if covered with masonry, they must have ladders.

The men should be in their waistcoats, to be less constrained. If they propose to make one or two true, and as many false attacks, so many platoons must be formed of the chosen party, as they are to make true ones, and the sustaining party to make the false attacks, so as to divide the enemy and share their fire. A man must be placed at the head of each platoon, who is capable of commanding them, and if possible, the same who had been employed before to make discoveries, as he may more easily guide the division. The orders which should be given to those leaders, are to march together to the place where they are to separate, and then each to go to the spot which is appointed for them, in the neighbourhood of the post, and wait there, with their bellies on the ground, for the sig-

nal to jump into the ditch and scale the post.

If you are to be conducted by spies or guides, they should be examined about every thing that can be of use, before they are employed, especially about the road by which they propose to conduct you. The reason of this is, because we often see simple people animated with the hope of gain, imagine they can easily lead a party, when they have only a great deal of good-will; but if you find in those who offer, all the necessary qualities, you must immediately secure them to you as much as possible, by making them dread the destruction of their houses, and pillaging their goods, if they lead the party into a snare; you may likewise ask their wives and children as pledges of their fidelity, and the moment of setting out, place them between the corporals of the first rank, tied with a small chain; which precaution is the more essential, as traitors have often been known, on pretence of conducting a par-

ty to seize a post, to have led them where they have had their throats cut in the middle of the night, and have disappeared at the very moment of its execution. If you make your guides hope for a recompence proportioned to their services on one side ; on the other, you must make them fear the cruellest punishment if they do amiss.

The night being the most proper time to march to the attack of a post, you should set out soon enough to be ready to make the attack an hour or two before day. Care must be taken that it is not moon-light when you propose making the attack ; the soldiers ought to march two and two, with the least noise possible, especially when passing between the enemies centries : you must likewise recommend to them, neither to speak, spit, or smoke. The detachments must get as opposite as possible to the salient angles of the intrenchment, as it is probable that they will be the least defended by the enemy's musketry. If a patrol

of the enemy comes while you are on your march, or ambushed in the environs, you need not be alarmed, nor make the least motion which may make the enterprize fail, but remain concealed in the profoundest silence, that the patrols may pass without perceiving any thing, and afterwards pursue your design.

If the post which you want to carry is a redoubt with a dry ditch and parapet of earth, your two first ranks must have spades and pick-axes, with their arms slung, and on the signal being given, jump into the ditch together; I say together, because it ought to be a general maxim in attacking a post, to strike all at once. When the first rank have jumped down, the second must stop a moment, that they may not fall upon the shoulders or bayonets of the first. The two first ranks having got into the ditch, they should immediately run to sap the angles of the scarp, and the parapet of the redoubt, to facilitate the mounting of the rest of the party; the

leaders of each division should observe at the same time, that the soldiers who remain armed with their firelocks, and who have likewise leaped into the ditch, do not interrupt those who are demolishing the scarp of the redoubt, but protect them by presenting their bayonets to the right and left, and be ready to repulse any of the enemy that happen to be placed in the ditch.

If the parapet is fraised, they should break as many of the fraises with hatchets as is necessary to let the men pass. When the breach is made, the workers should drop their working tools, and taking their arms from the slings, mount up with fixed bayonets, and rush upon the enemy huzzaing.

When you march to attack a redoubt or such post, where the enemy have a connection with more considerable posts, the commanding officer should charge on that side, so as to cut off the communication. People who see themselves briskly attacked without hope of succour or

retreat, will very soon beg for quarter.

When the scarps and parapets are of stone, they can only be carried by scaling, but you may succeed by being brisk in surrounding and sustaining the attack. An officer who is to attack a post of this kind, should take care that his ladders are rather too long than too short, and to give them in charge only to the stoutest of the detachment. The soldiers should carry these ladders with the left arm passed through the second step, taking care to hold them upright at their sides, and very short below, that they may not dislocate their shoulders in leaping into the ditch.

The first ranks of each division provided with ladders, should set out with the rest at the signal, marching resolutely with their firelocks slung at their backs to jump into the ditch. When they are arrived, they should apply their ladders against the parapet, observing to place them towards the salient angles rather than the middle of the curtain, because

the enemy have less force there. They must take care to place the ladders within a foot of each other, and not to give them too much nor too little slope, so as they may be overturned or broke with the weight of soldiers mounting upon them.

The ladders being applied, they who have carried them, and they who come after, should mount up and rush upon the enemy sword in hand. If he who goes first, happens to be overturned, the next should take care not to be drawn down by his comrade; but on the contrary, help him to pass between two ladders, and immediately mount himself, so as not to give the enemy time to load his piece.

As the soldiers who mount the first may be easily tumbled over, and their fall may cause the attack to fail, it would perhaps be right to protect their breasts with the fore-parts of light cuirasses, because if they can penetrate, the rest may easily follow. Some people may perhaps

treat this as an unnecessary precaution; but is it better to leave the whole to be knocked on the head in the ditch, or to carry it with safety, and the least danger?

The success of an attack by scaling is infallible, if they mount the four sides at once, and take care to shower a number of grenades among the enemy, especially when supported by some grenadiers and piquets, who share the attention and fire of the enemy.

During the siege of Cassel, under the Count de la Lippe, in the campaign of 1762, a young engineer undertook to carry one of the outworks, with a much smaller detachment than one which had been repulsed, and succeeded with ease, from the use of grenades; which is a proof that grenades ought not to be neglected, either in the attack or defence of posts.

If the ditch of a post is filled with water, and but middle deep, that should not hinder you from jumping into the ditch

to attack, in the manner that has been mentioned ; but if there is a greater quantity, and you cannot pass, the soldiers of each platoon should carry fascines, or faggots of small branches well bound, and made as large as possible, to fill up the ditch, and make a kind of ford, so as to get at the parapet, either to demolish or scale it.

Many ways of filling up the ditch, recommended by different authors, might be mentioned ; but the fascines are preferable to them all, as the soldiers can easily carry them before them, march quicker, and make use of them as a defence against musketry, and reaching them from hand to hand, soon make a ford.

If the approaches of the post are defended by chevaux de frise, the first and second rank of each platoon must break them down with hatchets, or with iron graplings tied to ropes, they may pull them to them, and separate them. If it is a breast-work of felled trees, you must

have fascines thrown against the points, or upon the branches, upon which the soldiers can easily pass. If there are two or three rows, you may burn them with dry fascines lighted at one end, and thrown in the middle row. In case of trying this last scheme, the soldiers must retire to a little distance after throwing the fascines, that the enemy may not see to fire at them by the light of the fire, but place themselves so that they can fire upon any who may attempt to extinguish it. If there are chauffe-traps, they must be swept away, by dragging a tree or two over the ground where they are scattered.

In the attack of detached buildings, you must seize the approaches, and strive to scale them; to get on the top, and crush the people who are below, with the tiles or slates; but if the enemy has uncovered the house, you must throw as many grenades as you can in at the windows and doors; or dry fascines, with lighted faggots dipped in rosin; or fire-

balls, to endeavour to set fire to them, and smoke them out. If the weather is windy, you should profit by it to set fire to the house, and try to shut up the loop-holes which the enemy have pierced near the ground, with bags of earth, so as to sap the corners. If you have some cannon, you may shorten the ceremony, by planting them against the angles of the post. If you have none, you may successfully suspend a large beam by a rope, to three bars placed in a triangle, in imitation of the Roman battering ram: this beam pushed violently against the walls, will soon make a breach; but you must observe, in suspending it, to do it in a dark night, so that the enemy cannot prevent it, by firing at the soldiers who are employed in the work. If it is glorious to get out with honour on such an attack, it is not less so, to make it so as to cost but few people. The blood of the soldiers is precious, and cannot be too much prized, and an able chief will neglect no means

that can contribute to their preservation. The comparing of two examples will show the importance of what is advanced.

During the two sieges of Barcelona, by Monsieur de Vendome in 1697, and Monsieur de Berwick in 1713. The first of these generals caused the convent of Capuchins, situated out of the place, to be attacked sword in hand by several detachments of infantry, and carried it in three hours, with the loss of seventeen hundred men. Marshal Berwick caused the same convent to be attacked in the year 1713. They were equally intrenched, and reckoning to make him pay as dear as Monsieur de Vendome had done; but this general having opened a sort of trench before the convent, they not expecting to be attacked in form, surrendered at discretion, after having held it twenty four hours. The reader is left to judge which example to follow.

You should prepare for the attack of a village or such like post of large extent,

as has been directed in the chapter for detached posts; but as these sort of attacks are always more difficult than others, on account of the multiplicity of schemes they have to encounter at every step, an officer should not march there till he is acquainted with the strength of the intrenchments; the situation of the smaller posts; the obstacles to be met with in every street or square; and even what terms the inhabitants are on with the soldiers of the garrison.

If an officer takes his information from country people, he should enquire in such a seemingly careless manner, that they may not discover his design to the enemy, and they take measures to prevent him: he must likewise endeavour to be well assured of the reports of the peasants, by comparing them with those of the deserters, and with what he has discovered himself. When he is well informed of the situation of the enemy, he should then make his dispositions for the attack, and observe to mention to those

who are to command the different platoons, all that they ought to do, either in real or false attacks. The real attacks should be made in places that appear inaccessible, because the enemy trusting to the difficulty of access, are always less guarded there. He may likewise attack the houses situated at the entrance of streets, because when they are once gained, it is easy to pierce the walls that separate the houses, from whence they can easily crush the enemy with stones, and force them to fly to their last intrenchment.

In an enemy's country whom you would not spare, it is easy, by setting fire to the four corners of the village, to force the besieged to surrender; but, beside its being inhuman to use means which tend to the devastation of a country, it is very dangerous to drive the inhabitants to despair, because they then fly into the woods, gather in parties, scatter themselves every where, murder the soldiers who stray, assassinate the fut-

lers, hinder every peasant from carrying provisions to camp, and destroy an army. We have seen, says Monsieur Follard, during the war of 1688, that fifteen hundred *Barbets* of the valley of St. Martin, kept forty battalions of our troops in awe in the valley of Pragelas, where the Cifone runs, in the bottom between two very high mountains of very difficult access, which each guarded on their side. These mountaineers descended sometimes when they believed our convoys were in the country, and attacked them. They were scarcely ten or twelve men, while we had entire corps.

It is very evident from this example, what may be the effects of gaining considerable posts by setting fire to them, and how much better it is to carry them by brisk attacks. An officer who commands an expedition of this nature, ought to take care how he confines himself to a single attack; the false frequently becoming true ones, he should know

the success of each, so as not to have people killed uselessly to gain a passage on one side, while it is open on the other.

When the assailants have penetrated into the village, the commanders of each division ought to take care to leave small detachments at all the churches and squares they find; to stand firm and sustain the main body in case they are repulsed. You must watch very carefully that the soldiers do not withdraw to pillage the houses of the inhabitants, as whole detachments have been drove from towns and villages where they had penetrated, from having neglected this precaution.

Three days after the surprise of Cremona in 1702, some Germans were found in the cellars where they had got drunk, and were astonished when they were told that they must quit these agreeable retreats. An officer who would shun a disorder so fatal, should forbid his soldiers to stir from his party on pain of

death, and by placing a serjeant in the rear of each division, take care that no one falls behind.

If you find cavalry drawn up in the squares or open places, the assailants should remain firm at the entrance of the streets that meet there, while some go up to the houses that are at the corners, and fire upon them from the windows: if this causes any disorder among them, they should be charged with fixed bayonets to make them surrender. If the interior part of the village is defended with cannon, you should march quickly to the place where they are, and take them, or nail them up, or turn them against the enemy or principal post of the village.

It may be judged by what has been said on the taking of posts, that though these actions are difficult, they are not impossible, when the means that are to be employed are properly connected. The methods are easy to imagine, and yet we rarely see examples of these actions, be-

cause there is not sufficient application given to this part of war, which to succeed in, requires great sense and courage, a quick and subtle fancy, much boldness, readiness in executing, and cautious foresight.

Polybius in his seventh book gives an account of an attack full of instruction for officers, for which reason the detail of the whole circumstances shall be taken from that work. The blockade of Sardis by Antiochus the Great, says he, had lasted two years when Lagoras of Crete, a man of extensive knowledge in war, put an end to it in the following manner. He considered that the strongest places are often taken with the greatest ease, from the negligence of the besieged, who trusting to the natural or artificial fortifications of their town, are at no pains to guard it. He knew likewise that towns are often taken at the strongest places, from their being persuaded that the enemy will not attempt to attack them there. Upon these consi-

derations, though he knew that Sardis was looked on as a place that could not be taken by assault, and that hunger only could make them open their gates, yet he hoped to succeed. The greatness of the difficulties only encreased his zeal to contrive a means of carrying the town.

Having perceived that a part of the wall which joined the citadel to the town was not guarded, he formed the design of surprizing it at that place: he observed that this wall was built on the top of a rock which was extremely high and steep, at the foot of which, as into an abyfs, the people of the town threw down the carcasses of their dead horses and other beasts of burthen, at which place great numbers of vultures and other carnivorous birds assembled daily to feed, and after having filled themselves, they never failed to rest upon the top of the rock or wall, which made our Cretan imagine that this place was neglected, and without any guard upon it.

On this thought, he went to the place

at night, and examined with care how he could approach it, and where he ought to place his ladders. Having found a place proper for his purpose, he acquainted the king with his discovery and design; and the king, delighted with the project, advised Lagoras to pursue it, and granted him two other officers whom he asked for, and who appeared to him to have all the necessary qualities for assisting him in his scheme.

The three having consulted together, they only waited one night, at the end of which there was no moon; which being come, they chose fifteen of the stoutest and bravest men of the army to carry the ladders, to scale the walls, and run the same risk that they did. They likewise took thirty others to place in ambush in the ditch, and to assist those who scaled the wall to break down a gate into which they were to enter. The king was to make two thousand men follow them, and favour the enterprize by marching the rest of the army to the opposite side

of the town. Every thing being prepared for the execution, Lagoras and his people approached softly with their ladders, and having scaled the rock, they came to the gate which was near them, and having broke it, let in the two thousand men, who cut the throats of all they met, and set fire to the houses, so that the town was pillaged and ruined in an instant.

Young officers who read this account, ought to reflect on this attack. The attention of Lagoras, who went himself to examine the places proper for fixing the ladders; his discernment in the choice of the officers and soldiers who were to support him; and the harmony of the whole means that were employed on the occasion, afford very excellent lessons for any officers who may attempt such an attack.

Though such stupendous rocks may be thought inaccessible by the besieged, yet this is a proof that no place is inaccessible when they have to do with such

penetrating geniuses as Antiochus's engineer Lagoras.

That part of the military science which comprehends the taking of posts, is little capable of being treated methodically. The understanding of every officer, and the occasions which chance produces, is what commonly gives room for the execution of these sort of actions. War is a business of schemes and projects, and there are numberless precautions which escape the foresight of men who carry it on, which a skilful enemy can observe, and which furnish occasions of making fine strokes. History contains many such examples, which are only rare now-a-days, because they do not study this part sufficiently, for which an elevated genius, and a combination of means, depending on a knowledge of the true situation of the enemy, whom we should always reconnoitre ourselves, are necessary.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Surprizes and Stratagems for seizing Posts.

A SURPRIZE in war is an unexpected attack by suddenly assaulting the enemy when he least expects it. The ways of practising them are infinite, for all the schemes that imagination has invented to make the enemy fall into some snare, are so many surprizes, with such an extensive variety of circumstances, that it has never been possible to give a compleat detail of them, notwithstanding all the lights that have been thrown on the subject by many excellent authors who have undertaken to treat this matter fundamentally.

We may refer all sorts of surprizes to two kinds; the one is, by means of ambuscades to attack the enemy on his march, which we shall treat of in the next chapter; the other, by making sudden irruptions into the posts of the

enemy and seizing them by open force, which we shall treat of at present; but that I may not exceed the bounds I have prescribed to myself, I shall only stop to mention the most advantageous circumstances which ought to be taken, and the surest means that can be employed to succeed; establishing for a general maxim, that we ought never to attempt to surprize a post of the enemy, without being well informed of his situation, strength, and manner of doing duty, three essential points the knowledge of which is indispensable.

All the environs that have any relation to the place the enemy occupies must be known; on what side lie the avenues, morasses, rivers, bridges, heights, woods, and all covered places that are in the neighbourhood, without which it is scarce possible to regulate approaches prudently. It is equally necessary to know nearly the number and kind of troops with which he possesses the post, that you may not attack him with insufficient force.

It is likewise necessary to know if the enemy is careful or remiss in carrying on his duty. The knowledge of these circumstances contributes infinitely to form a project of surprise well, and to conduct the whole expertly.

I shall speak first of such as may be executed by small parties, and where they need not have recourse to very extensive means for success, and then proceed with such as may be executed by the corps of a partisan, according to the arrangement we have given.

Monfieur Folard, in speaking of stratagems, says every general has his own; they are such as time and place produce, and which ought not to be neglected. There are many people who pretend that every thing is lawful in war, and that we are to succeed by what means we can; but this is not agreeable to those authors who treat of the rights of nations. If all schemes are thought equally moral in some that he relates, there are others where good faith and

a greatness of soul shine forth with lustre, while there are some again, where the most remarkable treachery and the cruellest means have been looked upon as the finesses of a skilful enemy.

I hope it is unnecessary for me to make any remarks on this head, as I trust that the pleas of honour and humanity will always have their full force with every officer in the British army.

The same author says that this part of war (stratagems) has not been treated fundamentally, though it were to be wished that these works were often read and meditated on by people of the profession. This sort of reading appears the more necessary, that beside being amusing, it is the more instructive, as by not being ignorant of stratagems, they know how to defeat them, or to make use of them upon occasion. To which I shall add, that we are not to imagine that these occasions are very scarce; they present themselves daily though they are not perceived, because they are not at-

tended to, or thought of after they are passed. Nothing however contributes more to the reputation of an officer than these sort of actions, but as Vegetius says, we should reach out our hands to fortune, and profit by the occasions that offer.

Among the surprisals of posts which may be executed by small parties under one officer, there are some to which they are invited by the ease in the execution, others by the closest attention in observing the enemy. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said already of the precautions to be taken when going to attack a post; it is sufficient to know, that as the disordering one wheel renders the whole machine useless, so we ought to examine with all possible attention, every mean that is to be employed for succeeding in our schemes. However brave the officers of our army are, we are not to expect them all equally capable of embarking in such enterprizes, for beside being of impenetrable secrecy and great discernment in the choice of

soldiers, they must have a perfect knowledge of the country, and be able to speak the language. Few officers possess all these requisites.

As to the manner of surprising a post, it is impossible to establish certain rules on the subject, because among a thousand means which chance offers, there are rarely two alike. The quickness of a concealed march upon a distant post negligently guarded; a thick fog which prevents being seen; a river where there is a ford the enemy is ignorant of; an aqueduct; a subterranean passage; a hollow road which is not guarded; a frozen rivulet; a blocked up passage; a secret correspondence; a fair or market day, and disguises of every kind, are the different stratagems that may be used as occasion offers, and by which we may promise ourselves success, though they have been frequently employed.

It must be observed, that there are stratagems with which it is impossible to succeed without a proper force to sustain

them. A town or village for example, where we are introduced by a secret correspondence, cannot be carried without being well seconded. The only means of managing the surprize of posts well, is to have for a maxim to divide your force instantly, to seize the castle, church, church-yard, or public squares. It has been said, that troops so divided can act but weakly, and run a risk of being defeated separately; but by making as many detachments as the enemy has posts, in the dismay caused by surprize, it is easy to carry these posts, before they who defend them have time to dispute them, or even look round them. The enemy being likewise obliged to divide, and not knowing what side to prefer, there is almost a moral certainty, that stupefied with noise which they hear all round, they are ready to let their arms drop out of their hands, beside, the horrors of a dark night, and the dread that cannot fail to seize a party who are surprized, represents objects much greater

than what they are, so that they imagine they have to do with a whole army.

The bad success of the affair at Cremona makes nothing against my opinion. If instead of stopping to make prisoners, a detachment had gone directly to the citadel, which should be the way in all these kind of actions, it would have been impossible for these brave officers who drove out the Imperialists, to have made so glorious a defence.

M. de Schower did otherwise when he surprised Benevar in Spain in 1708, and did not fail. He learnt that the Spaniards neglected the guard of an old castle which was at the entrance of the place, and marching in the night he took it, and detached several parties to attack the town. Surprised with such a visit they sought for safety in flight, and ran to take shelter in the citadel, but were scarcely entered when they were made prisoners. The enemy did not think of the attack being begun where they were strongest, but it is the best way,

as it is to be presumed they have divided their forces to be able to defend every where.

If these events are so rare now-a-days, it is because they sink almost always into oblivion, and the authors do not obtain any reward; yet what does not the man deserve, who is determined on an action of this nature at the hazard of his life.

M. Menard, in his history of Nismes, gives an account of the surprize of that town, which merits our attention. Nicholas Calviere called Captain St. Cosme having resolved to make himself master of this place, engaged a miller whose mill was situated within the walls, at the side of the gate, to file the bars of a grate which shut up the entry of an aqueduct, through which the water passed into the town, for several nights, to put wax on the filed places to conceal them in the day, and to receive a hundred armed men into his mill, while a more considerable body of cavalry and

infantry should arrive from different places to sustain the enterprize.

The day for the execution of his project being fixed for the 16th of November 1569, and proper orders given for the rendezvous of the troops, St. Cosme came out of the mill with his party at three o' clock in the morning, and advancing to the guard at the gate put them to the sword, and opening the gate let in two hundred horsemen with each a foot soldier behind him. These troops having entered the town, formed several detachments immediately, and one went to block up the citadel, while the rest scattering over the squares of the place, and founding their trumpets instantly made themselves masters of the town.

There are a number of circumstances mentioned in this surprize, which convey a great deal of useful instruction. Captain St. Cosme knew how to profit by the negligence of the governor, who omitted to guard the entrance of the

aqueduct; to make a proper choice of cavalry for advancing so readily with the infantry from different quarters; the justness of the orders to give the troops which brought them fifteen leagues from Nîmes at the hour and place appointed for the rendezvous; the precaution with which he invested the citadel, to prevent his having to do with the garrison in the streets; his attention in dividing his troops into the different quarters of the town and making them sound their trumpets, that the inhabitants should imagine they were very numerous, are so many circumstances which contain the most useful lessons for officers who may be induced to attempt such an enterprize.

There are instances of surprizes succeeding from singular address. Captain Brachia wanting to make himself master of a tower in the territory of Ambersa, caused one of his soldiers to disguise himself like a woman, and gave him a basket in his hand with a fickle.

This man so disguised ran as fast as he could to the tower, pretending to have fled from a party of the enemy: the guard let him enter and mount a ladder to the top of the tower to shew the centry where the enemy was; but he was scarcely got up, when he clove the centry's head with the sickle, seized his arms, and obliged those who were below to abandon the post.

It is in this manner that the impossibility of succeeding sometimes by force, should make us attentive to profit by the least omission of the enemy; and necessity is found to be the mother of invention in war as well as elsewhere, when there is a spirit not to be discouraged. The disproportion of forces, says Monsieur Folard, is not always in the number, but frequently the capacity of the one, opposed to the ignorance or negligence of the other.

It is only they who have a great love of glory, and whose valour is never daunted by danger, who know how to reduce

the enemy by stratagem, and seize the occasions which fortune presents. Gustavus Vasa seeing the sea frozen, made his soldiers pass in the middle of the night, to reduce the Danish navy to ashes which was near Stockholm, going to encrease the power of tyrants, and despair of the people. It were endless to seek to give the detail of the many stratagems that have succeeded; but the instances that have been given, with what has been said leading to it, may serve to give hints to detached officers.

The active corps of the partisan, without trusting to the stratagems that others have succeeded by, must find other resources than those against which people are so prepared now-a-days; and as the surprising of the enemy is the great business of the partisan in carrying on the *Petite Guerre*, he must see what can be effected by his hardiness and activity.

The expedient which appears to be the most proper for an officer who has four hundred infantry under his com-

mand, and is certain that the garrison is only two hundred, (for surprises should be always attempted with a double force) is to choose very bad weather; the strong winds, for example, and fogs in winter, or the storms and tempests in summer, when after excessive heats, violent winds rise suddenly, and agitate the air.

When you have meditated such a scheme, then is the time to put a part of your infantry in covered waggons, which should be kept ready for the purpose. The whole party to be provided with dog-skin covers for their gun-locks and cartouch-boxes, to take off readily when there is occasion; and the rest of the infantry to be mounted behind part of the cavalry. Both parties to assemble at some place a league distant from that which you would surprise, and there to stop; when, if you see the bad weather dissipating, you must retire till another occasion. If you renew it ten times, you need not despair; a strong place deserves this trouble; the blow is too honourable

and too important to lose courage, and success will over-pay every fatigue.

But on the contrary, if the storm forms, and the wind encreases, direct your approaches in such a manner, that you may always have the wind on your back, because if you have it in your face, the enemy's centries can look forward and discover you ; and likewise if it is in your face, your horses cannot be made to advance without a great deal of trouble. These precautions being taken, you advance more quickly as the storm encreases, the horses and waggons going with great speed before the wind. You need be in no uneasiness about the enemy's centries seeing you, or hearing the noise of your march, because the severity of the weather obliges them to enter their boxes, and turn their backs to the wind, to save their eyes from the dust and sharpness of the air.

At 300 paces from the place, the foot and part of the cavalry should dismount and fix their bayonets, the rest of the ca-

valry to remain with the waggons near some trees or houses, the waggons turned for a retreat. Divide your infantry into five detachments, and instantly run at a great rate, keeping your men as close as possible, and passing the barrier and gates, seize all the centries and the guard without firing or making the least noise, which may be executed with an extreme quickness, to be acquired by practice. While the first detachment seize the gate and all the centries of its environs, the rest must run rapidly into the town. One must go quickly to seize the main guard; another to seize the governor or commanding officer; the fourth, which should be the strongest, should fly to the caserns or mens barracks, to seize their arms; the fifth to remain in the street near the gate for a corps de reserve.

Every detachment must be conducted by prisoners made at entering, and orders sent with all speed, to cause half the cavalry to advance and patrolle the streets, as the infantry get forward.

As this kind of surprise can succeed only under favour of a storm, which rarely continues any time, it is evident that the march and execution must be conducted with inexpressible swiftness, and the orders be perfectly understood. It is true that rain is inconvenient for the infantry, whose feet slip on clay-ground; but they must do their best, and frequently it is found that the roads which are most used, are not therefore the most slippery.

If it happens that you are perceived in taking possession of the gate, and they take the alarm, you must quickly divide your party into two wings, mounting them on the rampart, the one to the right, the other to the left, and seizing the loaded cannon, turn them upon the town, and at the same time summon the garrison to surrender. If you happen to fail, and are obliged to retire, you do not risk much while the garrison are fewer in number, as they will not care to molest your retreat.

There may be a reluctance in attempting such a surprise; it may appear to be hazardous and rash, and a conduct too nice not to despair of success: but Mr. Jeney says that experience convinces him of the validity of the means proposed, and relates what happened to him upon two occasions, to prove that the cold east winds or storms are the most proper times for attempting surprises.

Being at the head of thirty hussars, says he, and willing to shun a storm which was gathering behind us, I pushed to get to a place which was well fortified and occupied by a numerous garrison: the wind was strong, and I passed the barriere and all the gates with my horses which made a great noise, without any centry either seeing or hearing; and though I called to the first guard to declare myself, no one perceived me. I crossed the whole town without seeing a soul in the street, and hurrying to an inn in the other suburbs, I went out at the gallop, and saw only the centry at the

last barriere, to whom I answered without our comprehending one another; nevertheless the rain had not begun to fall, but the wind was violent. I experienced the same during the winter, when the east wind was very proper to facilitate the surprize of a fortified town or post. On Christmas night, 1757, I passed thro' the country of Hanover with eighty horse between two guards of the enemy without being perceived. I marched over the middle of a plain when the night was clear, with a violent east wind, which prevented any centry from turning his head to look at me, and I went quietly to carry off horses in the rear of their army. The following night at my return, I passed two different posts of our army; the one guarded by a party of hussars, the other by a regiment of dragoons, without being seen but by one centry in the middle of the dragoon post, who durst not challenge, because it was no longer time, having passed the first guards.

You may likewise take the advantage of bad weather to scale all sorts of posts furrounded with walls, as towns, abbeys, castles, &c. to do which, you must approach in the dark, and seize the moment of a great squall, or when a cold east wind obliges the garrison to take shelter from the rigour of the season: then there is no one upon the ramparts, and the centries turn their backs to the wind, or remain in their boxes, while your people are warm with marching, and animated with the hopes of success. You need not be apprehensive of the enemy seeing you if you advance on the side next the wind to place your ladders, because the centries will cover their faces, and bend down their heads to save them from cold.

The time of a thick fog is not less favourable for approaching and forcing an intrenched post. When the fog is low, the infantry should creep on all fours, the better to conceal them from the enemy's centries. These sort of surprises are

the least dangerous, you run scarcely any risk; but if you cause some false attacks, the garrison will not fail to run to arms, and sometimes make you pay dear for failing.

When you would surprise the enemy in a village, farm, monastery, or some place detached from the army, you should divide your party into two bodies, each composed of cavalry and infantry; the one to take the enemy in the rear, the other in front, taking care to cause some waggons to follow, which may carry off the wounded in case of need. You must calculate exactly the time it will take the first detachment to go round the enemy. The two commanders should agree on a word for rallying, and the time of making the attack, which should be in the night, especially if the post is so distant from the army that they can receive no assistance, for in that case the time is favourable till day-break. They must regulate their departure according to the distance they have to go; and the de-

achment which goes round the enemy, ought to take no more infantry than can be carried behind the horsemen. This detachment having got round, should form about a quarter of a league from the post, and a hundred paces out of the road.

When the other detachment has arrived within a quarter of a league of the post, your cavalry should form out of the road with the waggons and drums near them, who are not to advance till ten minutes after the departure of the infantry, who must advance towards the fires of the enemy, stooping as much as possible. They must take care to conceal themselves from patrols, as has been directed, and when they see them passed or entered the post, the infantry must hurry on to gain the village, and clear the entry by which the cavalry must pass, in case it has been barricadoed with waggons. You must run rapidly to the place where you see the fires lighted, and make as many detachments as you see

fires, in order to surprize the whole at once.

The cavalry who followed slowly, must instantly join to the noise of your arms and cries their trumpets and drums, advancing with all speed, and leaving only a non-commissioned officer with some horsemen near the waggons. The detachment which is advanced on the other side of the village to turn the enemy, on hearing the alarm, must immediately advance, founding trumpets, beating drums, and attacking all who would save themselves on that side. You may rely on it as certain, that the enemy seeing all his guards surrounded by your infantry scattered in the village, and hearing the march of different bodies of foot and horse who arrive on all sides, will not delay to surrender, or seek to save himself by a disorderly flight; it will be easy then for your cavalry to fall upon the flying and stop them. The party should be forbid to pursue the enemy more than a quarter of a league

in the night; but no pursuit at all should be attempted, if it is in an inclosed country.

The post being taken, the booty and prisoners should be sent off immediately under the care of the infantry, putting the wounded in waggons, or on the horses that are taken, the cavalry making both the front and rear guard, and taking care to have the last the strongest. When the enemy's post is ten leagues or more distant from yours, it is certain that they will have less distrust, and be more easily surpris'd. In that case the infantry, with a lieutenant and twenty horsemen, should stop at half way, concealed in a wood or farm, keeping constant guard.

The commanding officer should leave this place at the head of the rest of the cavalry, and if he finds that he cannot arrive that night, he must cause them to carry refreshments. He must likewise take an intelligent guide from thence, to whom he must not communicate his

design, till they have gone some way on the road towards the enemy. He must accompany his declaration with promises and threats, assuring him that he will generously reward his zeal and fidelity ; but will kill him, or set his village on fire, if he attempts to deceive or run away.

At some little distance from the place, you must quit the road on the right or left, and be conducted to another which leads to some height the most convenient for passing a league on one side of the enemy's post. In bad winter weather you need not keep at such a distance, because there is less risk of meeting any one in the country.

When you get as far as the post, you must move obliquely to the road which leads from the enemy's army, and by which you must advance to attack the post. If it happens, that for want of roads, the guide must conduct you over fields and meadows, it is of little consequence provided that the route is conformable to the design.

A genius for war has sometimes pushed boldness so far as to surprise the wings of an army, encamped in a level country, on a plain uncovered on all sides. This sort of surprise is a temerity that is scarce to be imitated. The danger is great, and the retreat of so small a corps as that of a partisan, runs always the risk of a total defeat, unless it happens in the middle of a dark night, which can conceal your approach or your flight; but it likewise exposes you to take some very dangerous steps in the dark; to wander from your route, and to disperse your people; for which reasons I would never advise any one to try such fortune.

The case is very different when the enemy's camp extends into a mountainous country, covered with woods to secure your retreat; for then, with the assistance of a good guide gained by money or promises, you may be conducted in the night into woods, and secure your approaches by gullies and by-ways.

You must take great care in coming out of the wood that you do not come upon some post in the front of the wing you want to surprize; because, in that case, you must leave a detachment of infantry at the passage. While your cavalry advance to get round their advanced post, another detachment of cavalry and infantry must place themselves opposite to the flanks of the post. You must then fall briskly upon the wing of the camp with cavalry alone, and at the same instant, the detachment left on the flanks must attack the post with the infantry stooping as they advance; and in the attack, both should set up a most frightful cry to alarm the whole army.

As it is certain that the piquet of the army will not delay to run to their assistance, you must instantly seize and carry off whomsoever you meet, officers, soldiers, or their horses, and every thing you can take away, making haste to regain the passage. The cavalry should go first with the booty and prisoners, the

infantry making the rear guard till they are out of the wood, and then take the front. You must endeavour to make at least half the retreat that night, and be sure that the enemy does not follow you in the night, lest you be taken in flank.

There is no time more precious for a partisan, or that merits so much attention, as that of a battle, when every one is attentive to the great firing which they hear on all sides; to the manoeuvres of the armies that are engaging; to the decision of an affair of the greatest importance, upon which the fate of each depends. It is then that he can employ his skill to the greatest advantage; strike the severest blow that is possible; cause the ruin of the enemy; pillage the quarters of their generals; carry off their equipages; defeat their guards; set fire to their camp; and spread an alarm over all, which may contribute to the defeat of the army.

But measures must be taken to execute so great, so brilliant a project, with

success; and it should not be engaged in, till after having prudently regulated the design on three principal circumstances; viz. the situation of the enemy's camp; the means of approaching it; and the hour of engaging. When the enemy's camp is in the middle of a great plain, or on a height with an extensive view on all sides, it is certain that one cannot approach without being seen at a distance; and in that case, prudence will put a stop to zeal, and prevent rashness from attempting impossibilities; but when their position extends over a country covered with mountains, woods, or villages, the occasion is more favourable, and may almost insure success.

It is then very advantageous for a partisan to be perfectly acquainted with the situation of places that are in front of his army; especially when he foresees that the enemy will sooner or later come to encamp there. What assistance would it not give for the direction of his project, if he knew how to take a plan of

that part of the country which he proposes to invade before hand? Then, without the weak and dangerous assistance of spies and deserters, he can by his own proper knowledge think of every means for executing a design, which ought to be regulated and conducted with impenetrable secrecy.

When he perceives by the motions of the armies that they are on the eve of an action, he must not delay to acquaint the general with his project. If he consents, he will regulate the rest, and the time of departure, according to the advices which he receives.

As these sort of expeditions cannot be made but by long circuits, they must take the time necessary for the march. In the campaign of 1757, the Duke of Richlieu caused his army to advance near Zell to attack our army, and sent a partisan with a hundred horse to the rear of the camp the day before, who having made a march of twenty-two leagues, arrived without any accident;

but the prudence of the prince of Brunswick defeated his design, and left him to admire his retreat; nevertheless, they picked up some stragglers, horses, and waggons.

Among the measures that ought to be taken to secure the blow, and strike it more effectually, it should not be forgot to distribute cockades like the enemy's to all the cavalry, and to give a stick of six feet long to twenty of each detachment, with a bit of torch fixed on the end, and covered with a little dry straw or hemp, to kindle instantly.

The whole party to set out from the camp A, (Plate IX.) marching under the conduct of a good guide by covered ways, at a distance from the enemy. Being come to the place C, which ought to be in the environs, and as high as the field of battle, the infantry should be concealed out of the road far from the sight of passengers. This must be the center of correspondence with the army; the rendezvous of the booty; and support the re-

treat of all the cavalry, of which there should be as many detachments formed as you propose to make attacks. We shall suppose six of a hundred men each, and they must go secretly by particular routes to their respective posts E, D, F, G, H, I. Neither trouble nor expence should be spared to procure good guides. Each detachment should lie in ambush half a league, if necessary, from the object of the attack, BKKKK.

The noise of the musquetry of the armies to be the signal for their irruption; and then bravery, intrepidity, and courage will give wings to your people. The second detachment D will glance imperceptibly between the villages, and fall like thunder upon the camp B; and while eighty attack all whom they meet, the other twenty should light their torches at the fires that are to be found every where, and spread the flames rapidly to the straw of the tents. As they cannot fail to have the piquet of the camp soon at their heels, they must

strike their blow with all possible quickness without stopping to plunder; being content with the glory of having excited a general alarm, capable of confounding the whole army, and contributing to the gaining of a battle.

At the same time that the detachment D attacks the camp B, the others E, F, G, H, must with equal violence attack the villages K, K, K, K, which they have in front, doing the same the first did in camp, except that they may plunder every thing which they can easily carry off of the generals equipages, with which these villages are commonly filled; seizing the best horses, hamstringing others with the stroke of a sword, and setting fire to all the places which contain the enemy's baggage. Each detachment should cause some horsemen to advance beyond the village, to observe the motion of the troops that will not fail to run to their assistance. As soon as they perceive them, they must make their retreat as fast as possible by the

routes which the commanding officer has premeditated, and which are proposed to be represented by the coarser hatched lines. The sixth detachment H, in ambush on the side of the road leading from the camp, should remain there, to seize all the enemy who think of saving themselves by flight.

There is no danger to be apprehended in these expeditions, during the critical instant while the armies are engaged, and all the troops a great way in front of the camp; you meet none but sutlers, servants, lame people, and some picquet guards scattered here and there whom you may easily defeat as they advance. The commanding officer ought to have an eye over all, and as soon as he perceives some bodies of troops advancing upon him, he ought to retreat quickly and at least gain the entrance of the wood.


I believe it is easy for every partisan to regulate his operations conformable to the strength of his corps, and the en-


virons of the camp which he proposes to attack, upon the plan which has been given. The chief care should be to determine properly the ambuscades of the cavalry, to place them so as to rush at once on the camp and the quarters of the generals.

Each detachment having rejoined the infantry must there wait the fate of the battle, so that if it is decided in favour of their army, they may speedily regain the properest places for harrassing the enemy on his retreat. These moments are the more favourable, as disorder, dread, and noise, render all defence impracticable. But all these sort of surprises require places proper to cover approaches and retreats.

Having mentioned the necessity of a partisan's being master of the languages, and the advantage derived from address in carrying a post by surprise, the following instance may serve as an illustration of it.

In the campaign of 1760, that ex-





cellent general and true genius of a partisan the prince of Brunswick, was situated at some distance from Zerenberg, at that time in the possession of the French, and being informed by two Hanoverian officers who had been in the town disguised like peasants, that the garrison were very remiss in their duty, trusting to the vicinity of their army, and the distance of ours. The prince was resolved to surprise them, and after appointing a corps to sustain him, he advanced in the night with Major Maclean of the 88th regiment, and two hundred Highlanders, with bayonets fixed and their arms not loaded, following at a little distance. Upon the first centry's challenging, the prince answered in French, and the centry seeing but two persons advancing, (whom he believed to be French,) he had no distrust, so that the major getting up to him, stabbed him, and prevented his giving the alarm. The Highlanders immediately rushed in and attacked the guard with their bayo-

nets, and carried the town, having killed or taken the whole garrison of eight hundred men.

The French officer who commanded at that time in Zerenberg concerted a scheme for being amply revenged, which failed only by a most trivial accident. When almost every house in Bremen was filled with corn, being the grand magazine, and grand hospital of our army, this officer held a secret correspondence in the town, which informed him of the state of the garrison, and that there was a general order to let couriers going to the army pass out at all hours. He dispatched about twenty hussars to scamper over the country, who were all that were heard of his party, while he marched fifteen hundred infantry from Dussledorp to Bremen, (about two hundred miles,) concealing them in woods by day, and marching in the night. He arrived at the gate at the appointed hour, when a person on horseback blowing a horn came along the street, and desired to pass out to the army. The officer of the

guard had the keys, and happened to be out of the way, and while a messenger went for him, the people without growing impatient, began to break down the outer barriere, which made the centry fire at the place where he heard the noise, and the guard taking the alarm, got upon the rampart and likewise fired at the same place, upon which the pretended courier galloped back, and the French believing that they were discovered, relinquished their scheme and retired.

This example proves that no distance is a security from surprises, and that very considerable parties may pass over a great extent of country without being discovered. I cannot omit giving an instance of that presence of mind so much the happiness of all who possess it, and more particularly of a military man so exposed to surprises.

In the month of February 1761, when Prince Ferdinand beat up the quarters of the French, they were obliged to retire a great way without being able to re-

sist, however, when they came to collect their force, and to recoil upon our army, Sir William Erskine with the 15th regiment of light dragoons was in a village in our front. In a very foggy morning, soon after the patrols reported that all was well, Sir William was alarmed by his vedettes having seen a large body of cavalry coming to surprise him. He instantly mounted his horse, and sallied out at the head of the picquet of fifty men, leaving orders for the regiment to follow as fast as they could mount, without beating a drum or making any noise. He attacked their advanced guard in the cursory manner of the light cavalry, and continued to do so, while his men were joining him by tens and twenties, and the French cavalry forming to resist an attack, till he collected the whole, and then retired, the surgeon of the regiment (Mr. Elliot) having in the mean time carried off the baggage.

Strokes of this kind display a superi-

brity of genius, and to that alone was the preservation of the regiment owing. Had a drum beat to arms, the enemy must have known that they were unprepared, and probably would have rushed in and destroyed them; but the attack convinced them that they were discovered, and made them think only of their own preservation.

Among many instances in the course of the war, the success of this officer on another occasion where he displayed the most singular address, likewise merits our attention. After a repulse, and a march of seventy-two miles in one day, when the men were fatigued and scarcely a horse able to trot, he saw a regiment of French infantry drawn up with a morass in their rear. He left his own corps, and advancing to the French desired to speak with the commanding officer, whom he entreated to surrender to prevent their being cut to pieces by a large body of cavalry that were advancing. The French officer desired leave to consult with his

officers, which having done, they refused to submit, but upon Sir William telling them that their blood must be on their own heads, and turning to move off to his own corps, they called to him, and laying down their arms surrendered to his harassed troops.

Such stratagems overleap the bounds of instruction, and no author will presume to propose them for imitation. Here was the reaching out the hand to fortune which Vegetius recommends, but there are few who have the requisite talents from nature, and we may as properly say of the foldier as the poet *nascitur non fit*.

To surprise and carry off some general officer, or other considerable person in some distant place in the rear of the enemy's army, you should take only a detachment of twelve horsemen, known to be worthy the confidence of the commanding officer, and who you can depend upon will not desert to betray you. Each horseman should have a double sur-

out with the two sides like two different regiments of the enemy, so that being perceived under one colour, they may quickly turn them, and appear again under another. This disguise will hinder the country people from making a just report, and agreeing in the rout the party have taken. They must take great care to keep at a distance from all roads, and not to stop but under cover. The quarter-master must take care to procure refreshments from some place in the neighbourhood where they must pay ready money, and not fail to do so till the blow is struck.

I shall only add one word more on the subject of surprises and stratagems for the seizing of posts, upon which volumes may be wrote, which is, that after having formed the design and examined it in all its branches, it is not necessary to stop in the middle of the execution on discovering an unforeseen obstacle.

After the battle of Cannae, Hannibal advanced to the gates of Rome with a

design to besiege it; but he was prevented by a great noise which he heard in the night like people laughing very loud: the Romans astonished next day at his retreat, built a temple which they dedicated *Deo ridiculo*.

I shall not push my reflections on the taking posts by stratagems any farther, because it is easy to see by the examples that have been met with, that they are not so difficult as is generally imagined. Timorous people who are stopped by the smallest difficulties may look upon them as impossible, and imagine there is something supernatural in those who succeed; but it is not for them, it is for the men of genius, courage, and application to judge of the methods proposed.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Ambuscades.

AN ambuscade may be formed in any place covered by art or nature in which a party may be concealed to surprise the enemy in passing, and the proper use of them is, of all the stratagems in war, the best calculated to display the genius, skill, spirit, and address of a partisan. They are easily carried into execution in woods, buildings, and hollow places; but require a more fertile imagination, and greater trouble in a level country. Both ought to be regulated by the knowledge of the enemy's march, and the extraordinary means that may be employed to surprise them.

When a partisan has information that can be depended on of the march of some part of the enemy; whether a convoy of artillery, baggage, or provisions; a body of recruits, or horses to remount the ca-

valry ; an escort of a general officer going to rejoin, or reconnoitre some country : he ought to apply directly to procure a sufficient knowledge of the route that the enemy is to take, the situation of the places he is to pass, and of the post he goes to. The better to cover his design, he must get information of the roads that lead to opposite places, which he must pretend to be attentive about, as has been mentioned in the chapter of reconnoitring.

Having perfectly concerted his plan, he should set out at the head of his detachment if possible, and leaving his post on the side opposite to his true route, the better to conceal his design. If the place where he intends to plant his ambuscade is not distant, he should come into his true route about half way, and there place half his infantry in ambush to favour his retreat. But when the country where he proposes going is distant, and the march requires at least two nights, he must conduct his party by meandering

from wood to wood, if there are any. He must not forget to provide necessary refreshments for the day, which must be passed in some concealed place where he may not be perceived, and must cause three rations of oats to be carried for each horse.

The first night you must make to some wood or other place proper for passing the day near some rivulet, and, if possible, on the road of your retreat to leave a part of your infantry in ambush, in case there is no other water to pass till you come to the place of your principal ambuscade; for when there is still a river or canal to pass, you must conduct the infantry to the passage, and choose the most convenient place to fix them in ambuscade.

If there is no bridge or ford, the cavalry must swim over, in which we suppose the horses are practised. When there is a ford, half the infantry should pass behind the cavalry, to go along with them. In case there is a bridge to pass near the

village, the officer who is left in this post with some infantry, should be enjoined to allow no one peasant or soldier to leave the place, and for greater security, a small detachment of cavalry should remain with him, to stop any who may attempt to run away before the return of the whole corps, who ought not to delay long. If the enemy come in the interval to attack the bridge, it must be defended till the return of the party, that their retreat may not be cut off.

The following case will prove its importance. The Count Esterhazy being detached with three hundred cavalry to levy contributions in the environs of Straßbourg, left a lieutenant with thirty men to guard the bridge at Wolfheim; the lieutenant from some motive or other quitted his post, when happily for the detachment, chance brought Mr. Jeney there with ten chasseurs, and he was scarcely arrived, when he saw three large parties of French hussars advancing to take possession of the passage. He had

only time to throw himself with his small party in a hurry into a mill that seemed to command the bridge, and having made loop-holes through the wall, he kept such a constant and deadly fire, that he disputed the passage till Count Esterhazy's detachment hearing the noise of the musketry, came almost a league, surprised the enemy in the rear, and in five minutes took eighty horses, and several prisoners.

Every precaution being taken to guard the bridge, the commanding officer should be diligent to arrive at the place of ambuscade two hours before the enemy is to pass, and place the ambuscade on the side he would retire to; never on the other side, if possible, lest the advanced guard happen to discover you, and oblige you to repass in sight of the corps, who seeing your strength, may rush upon you, and drive you back.

The infantry A [Plate X.] ought to be ambushed at least six hundred paces behind the cavalry B, so that if they are

purfued, they can fall back to A, and both afterwards to the guard at the bridge, or to the infantry that are in ambuſh at half way.

If the ambuſcade is placed in a wood, an intelligent non-commiſſioned officer ſhould be choſen to get upon a high tree C, from whence he can ſee the march of the enemy, and give notice of the moſt eſſential circumſtances: there are three; the firſt is, the ſeeing the advanced guard; the ſecond is, the approach of the corps; and the third is, the time when their front is advanced as far as the ambuſcade B; for which the commanding officer ſhould inſtruct the obſerver what ſignals he is to make from the top of the tree, to communicate the neceſſary information without ſpeaking, which may be done by the means of a ſmall cord D, of a brown or green colour, ſo as to be leaſt perceivable. Let this cord be placed as in the plan, ſo that no branch interrupt it, with one end in the hand of the obſerver, and the other in the commanding officer's in the ambuſcade B.

As soon as the advanced guard appears, the observer must pull the cord, and the commanding officer cause the party to mount, and remain in deep silence. If by a stratagem which is frequently practised for particular reasons, the advanced guard is immediately followed by the corps, which may easily be known by their being more numerous than ordinary, and not followed by any other corps, that you may not be deceived by the enemy, the cord should be drawn a second time, and a third time when their front is advanced as high as the ambuscade, upon which you must rush out, and pour furiously upon the flank of their center in the following manner.

If the advanced guard E is formed only of an ordinary number, they should be let pass, and at the approach of the principal party or convoy F, the chief to be informed by the second pulling of the cord. At the moment the head of the convoy shall be advanced as high as

B, the cord must be pulled the third and last time, at which signal the whole party must rush out without being perceived, and suddenly attack the center upon the flank, engaging only with their swords, and making such a noise as to prevent the enemy from hearing the orders of their officers. They must disarm all whom their bravery or chance throws in their way, taking care not to scatter or pursue too far, unless you are sure that they are so far from their army or other parties that they cannot be assisted; for in either of these cases, they will not fail to run at the noise, and disturb your retreat.

In all secret expeditions you ought to be extremely circumspect that you may not be seen or betrayed. If the advanced guard discovers you before the blow is struck, abandon the enterprise immediately, and retire. When your guide, or some one of your party deserts, and you cannot catch them, think immediately of retreating, or placing your ambuscade

somewhere else; therefore, to prevent such a misfortune, the officers should be charged to examine frequently if they have all their people.

You should never form an ambuscade for cutting off the enemy's retreat, as this manoeuvre will give them an idea of rallying, and attacking you in despair; but the case is different when you are well informed that you run no risk in stopping their whole force, either from the nature of the defile where they cannot form, or from the smallness of the number which cannot resist.

It is equally difficult and dangerous to form several ambuscades at once; the more are formed, the more they are exposed to be discovered, and less in a state to unite for a retreat; but we except when they are to be employed to seize foragers, for then it is very proper to form several, and to dispose them in such a manner that the centres can see from one to another. These dispositions being made, they who chance to be next

the foragers must strike the blow, while the other march to secure the retreat of their companions, as soon as they perceive it.

In all ambuscades, no centries should be placed but officers, or non-commissioned officers. On downs, behind mountains, or in gullies, the centries should lie with their bellies on the ground, and their feet towards the ambuscade, the body covered with a grey or green cloak, according to the colour of the ground, with their heads a little raised, and wrapped in a handkerchief of a straw-green colour, or white in time of snow, so as not to be perceived. The number of centries cannot be determined, but should be disposed so as to watch on all sides of the ambuscade, and stop every one who from ignorance approaches too near. The centries should give notice of what they discover by gestures, to which all the officers should be very attentive.

In countries where there are no woods, vineyards, or hedges, you may place an

ambuscade in a field of hemp or corn, or some sort of grain, provided it be high enough to cover you, at least with the help of art. When the stalk of the corn, &c. is not high enough, you must get some of the infantry to work with spades and pick-axes, which they must have brought along with them.

The commanding officer must mark out the ground A [Plate XI.] which they are to prepare for an ambuscade, entering at the side B, and raising in the front, and at the two flanks, a kind of parapet C, made with an insensible slope outwards, covered with corn raised from the surface of the ambuscade in form of square turfs of a foot thick D. They should be ranged and placed one against the other till they have gained six feet and a half. If the grain is not more than three feet high, it is plain, that forming the slope imperceptibly to a foot and a half high, with the earth dug of the same depth, the grain which borders the ambuscade will be six foot and a half from the bot-

tom, reckoning the thickness of the turf, which serves to shew that such a work ought not to be declined in arable ground so easily worked. When the soldiers have finished the work, a subaltern officer must lead them back to the place destined for the infantry.

The ambuscade being thus made at a hundred paces from the road where the enemy are to pass, they should lead the horses into it one after another by the bridle, so as not to enlarge the entry: the horsemen to range themselves standing, and holding the bridles in their hands, with the reins slackened on the horses necks. The officers should be continually employed in visiting the party, and waking those who sleep, and be equally careful to deface all traces of the entry, that none may appear near the ambuscade.

Ambuscades may be placed advantageously in hollow roads when they open obliquely behind that of the enemy, as the road K, [Plate X.] which enters

by an acute angle upon the route F of the enemy; nor is there greater difficulty in concealing themselves in the gullies of some rivulet G, [Plate X.] when the borders are of a sufficient height, or have shrubs that run parallel with the road of the enemy. It is extremely dangerous to fix there when the road of the enemy approaches towards, or crosses too near the ambuscade, as they cannot fail to discover it.

As these gullies are not very large, it is necessary to have a number of ways to rush out quickly on the enemy: I suppose four, H, H, H, H, by which the cavalry can dart out suddenly upon the enemy at F.

It will be proper before placing the party, to cause the rivulet to be cut somewhat higher, to give it a new course I, so that the horses feet may be dry in the gullies, and make less noise, and the shorter way they have to go, they will more certainly succeed. The commanding officer will not fail to dispose them in

such manner, that the whole can rush out at once by the four passages, and pour in great numbers upon the flank of the enemy.

In such sort of ambuscades, the commanding officer should himself be the centry, leaning upon the edge, and covering himself so that he may see every thing without being perceived.

In deserted villages they may fix an ambuscade in the gardens G, [Plate XI.] or in the barns H. The doors fronting the enemy must be shut up, and the passages which are marked by small dots made use of; for it is a general rule in all ambuscades, to sally forth in such manner as to take the enemy obliquely behind their front.

You ought never to employ infantry in the ambuscades I have been describing, where the cavalry act, unless to favour their retreat: but when you go at hazard, seeking to draw the enemy into an ambuscade, then the infantry should have their turn. Neither woods, villages,

nor any places which are much covered, are proper for them; however unskilled an enemy may be, he will not follow a party on the skirts of a forest, or in the neighbourhood of some covered place, for which reason there are no places fitter for succeeding with ambuscades of infantry, than heaths, hilly countries, hollow roads, corn fields, ditches at the side of great causeys; provided always that you do not plant them on roads that lead to your army, for then the enemy will take care how he pursues you too far.

When you would place an ambuscade on a heath, or in a country full of little hills, your infantry must lie down with their bellies on the ground. If there is some water near them, it may suggest to them to wet their cloaths and cover them with dust, to give them the colour of the ground; but that this party so laid on the ground, may not be crushed or trod upon by the enemy's horse when hurried along with violence, they must


preserve the flank of the ambuscade I, next the enemy, with a bar K, which may be made in a hurry with some stakes drove in the ground, at ten foot from one another, and about five or six foot high, held together by cross pieces tied about five foot from the ground, which can be easily done in the neighbourhood of a wood. The time for the infantry to fire, is when the enemy's cavalry L, passing before the front, stretch their flank the whole length of the ambuscade, then your cavalry M, must quickly face about and attack the enemy. Their defeat will be so much the more certain, as the fire of your infantry happens to have driven their squadrons into confusion.

To ambush in the ditch of a great causey, you must choose the deepest place, and at the edge of a corn field which is pretty high, and there place your people sitting or kneeling. You should collect as many small round bushes as possible, which are to be found in plenty in the country, which should be planted as if



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naturally, along the side of the road in front of your party, and beyond the ambuscade on the side you expect the enemy, and here and there so open, that the enemy being accustomed to them may pass without distrust. You should then make the corn lean over to cover the ambuscade; but if there is none near enough the ditch, you must have as many squares cut in the manner directed above, as will cover the edge of the ditch. Some of the corn so transplanted should be beat down, but to appear as if done by hail or wind.

Mr. Jeney ambushed in this manner with fifty men, when under the command of Captain Palafti, who advanced with his cavalry upon the causeway leading to Straßbourg, and as soon as he was perceived, 400 Bavarian dragoons advanced to attack him: he wheeled about, and the dragoons believing themselves masters of the booty, did not fail to pursue, and arrived before the ambuscade without suspecting. Mr. Jeney let their front

pass, and fired such a deadly fire upon their center, that he brought to the ground seventeen killed or wounded; at the same time, the cavalry who pretended to fly, faced about and attacked the enemy, and would have compleated their defeat, if it had not been for the great support of cavalry and infantry hurrying out of Straßbourg to sustain the dragoons; nevertheless he carried off more than fifty horses.

An officer having placed his infantry in ambuscade, ought to send on the cavalry at day-break, a non-commissioned officer with six of the best mounted horsemen, making the advanced guard: they should advance as far before the party as the commanding officer can see. At sight of the enemy, they should begin to retire slowly without flying, at least till the enemy comes to pursue with keenness: in that case, the advanced guard makes the rear guard, and may drop a few shot at the enemy, to harass them and draw them on, or make pretended

delays to excite them to pursue, till they fall by degrees into the ambuscade.

When you cannot place your infantry in ambush without having a village between them and the enemy, the cavalry should not be sent beyond the village, because the enemy will never expose themselves to cross it in following your party, for fear of falling into some snare; but instead of going beyond it, your cavalry should enter the village, and demand refreshment for fifty men, if the party are a hundred; then make three or four peasants carry orders to the magistrates of the villages that are towards the enemy, to come to you, and regulate the delivery of waggons and forage, or some other pretence. The peasants will not fail to acquaint the enemy, and to describe your strength and situation according to what they have heard, and the enemy will certainly come with superior force, and that they may come more speedily, they will bring no infantry.

As soon as the peasants are gone, you must be careful to let none of the inhabitants leave the place, and send continually some strong patrols to the rear on the road of your retreat, and especially to the passages by which they can cut off your communication with the ambuscade. Every horseman holding his horse by the bridle must be ready to mount, so that upon the enemy's appearing, you may retire quickly from the village, and fall back one after another upon your ambuscade.

When a partisan has no infantry, he may form an ambuscade with cavalry, which should be as near as possible to the enemy. In the night, he should send out two or three waggons covered with white linen, that they may be seen at a distance: care must be taken that the harness be in good order, so that no troublesome accident happen by the want of attention to it. Each carriage to have four horses, mounted by two dragoons disguised like waggoners, with

their arms in the hands of two or four comrades concealed in each waggon, so that they may repulse any patrolle they chance to fall in with.

The waggons should go slowly on some road parallel to the front of the enemy, and passing at some distance from their post, (for it is not necessary that they pass through them) and regulate their march so, that they may be within half a league of the ambuscade at day-break, and readily perceived by the enemy, then let them stop while one mounts a tree, or some height to see round them. When they perceive the patrolle of the enemy, they must move off, for the others will not fail to follow; but if the enemy appears not to be inclined to follow, which the non-commissioned officer must attend to, and make one of the drivers stop, as if something were the matter with his waggon, which will draw them on till they fall into the ambuscade.

Among the thousand opportunities

that the different marches of the enemy offer for ambuscades, there is none more proper than the retreat of an army which decamps to fall back. When a partisan happens to get information of it on the eve by good spies, he ought to set out immediately with his whole party, making such a round as has been drawn in Plate IX. leaving his infantry in ambuscade at half way.

The cavalry must be diligent to arrive at the place of ambuscade by day-break, which ought to be placed on the route that the enemy is to take, and two or three leagues in the rear of his camp.

To be more secure of his retreat, he should leave two or three detachments of cavalry between him and his infantry, at a good distance from one another; the remainder to line the road in several ranks parallel to it, and three or four hundred paces behind one another, concealed from the view of passengers by the favour of hollows, woods, or hills.

The first line being near the road must

take care of futlers, equipages, &c. which are the forerunners of an army, and the first to decamp when they are retiring. When they secure some waggons or mules, the first detachment should pass them to the second, and so on till they come to the infantry.

You must hasten to carry off what you can for a full quarter of an hour, after which you must press your retreat, expecting that the alarm will soon pass to the army, and the light troops be instantly at your heels.

C H A P. XV.

Of the Retreat.

EVERY march in withdrawing from the enemy is called a retreat. That which is done in fight of the enemy, who pursues with a superior force, makes my present subject; and is, with reason, looked upon as the glory of the profession. It is a manoeuvre the most delicate, and the properest to display the prudence, genius, courage, and address of an officer who commands; the histories of all ages testify it, and historians have never been so lavish of eulogiums as on the subject of the brilliant retreats of their heroes. If it is important, it is no less difficult to regulate, on account of the variety of circumstances, each of which demand different principles, and an almost endless detail.

The bounds which I have prescribed to myself will confine me to the most es-

essential: however, I shall explain myself in such a manner, that it will be easy to apply the general to particular cases.

The success of the retreat depends upon the knowledge of the country that is to be passed over, and the goodness of the disposition that is made for the troops to defend themselves. The first offers advantages, and contributes greatly to the seizing them; the second restrains the ardor of the enemy, and keeps up the force of a party to its highest pitch. Both deserve to be studied.

1st, Every officer who commands a detachment ought to apply himself carefully to reconnoitre every step he takes, and examine perfectly every route that can conduct him from one place to another; he should observe attentively all the stratagems that can be employed for ambushing infantry, or posting cavalry; the course of rivers, their bridges and fords; the roads most covered with woods, hills, gullies, and villages; and in a word he should know all the advantages, as

well as the dangers that lie in his way. It will be easy for him to acquire a knowledge of all this, if he will use the method recommended in Chapter X. With the assistance of such a plan he may regulate his retreat with ease, and put it in practice to advantage, profiting by every means proper for his defence, or surprizing the enemy.

2dly, The dispositions that ought to be made for a party, to sustain their retreat in the face of the enemy, depend upon the number and kind of troops in both corps; for they must be varied according as they happen to be of cavalry or infantry united, or of either singly.

Every forced retreat in consequence of an unfortunate action, would be almost impracticable, if it were not premeditated before you come in presence of the enemy, or when you are obliged to fly by unknown routes. That which can be made in a fog, or in the night, is easiest, when your rear is secured, as you can slip out of sight of the ene-

my without any difficulty, and they will be afraid of following you for fear of being surpris'd in the dark: we shall only therefore speak of that which is to be made in open day, and under the fire of the enemy.

To conduct it properly, you must absolutely know the strength of the enemy; for it is shameful to be the dupe of a false alarm, and to retreat precipitately from an ill-founded fear at the approach of an inferior enemy. You must therefore be convinced of his great superiority, and know what his party consists of.

If they come with a strong cavalry, united to a more numerous infantry than yours, you must immediately render their acting useless, by hurrying your infantry as quick as possible to retreat to the first place where they can lie in ambush, and serve the cavalry advantageously, if they can draw on those of the enemy, as has been said in speaking of ambuscades.

To conceal from the enemy, and favour the departure of your infantry, you should cause your cavalry to advance, and pretend as if they were going to attack the enemy A, [Plate XII.] your party forming in two divisions B and C, each drawn up in two lines, the second double the first, and disposed as in the plan.

The division C is to retire first 100 or 200 paces, and then fronting the enemy divide into two wings, leaving an interval for the passage of the division B, who, in retiring, must leave a rear-guard at fifty paces, which must be divided into several parties D, to scamper about the enemy's front; and in case they appear desirous to attack you, your small parties must keep a constant fire, particularly on the sides that advance the most; and continue this manoeuvre till they have joined the division C, which should immediately detach some small parties of the best mounted to serve for a rear-guard, and to harass the ene-

my, till the division B is drawn up an hundred paces in the rear, and divided into wings, leaving an interval for the division C to pass through in its turn; and continue to manoeuvre it in this manner, till you draw the enemy's cavalry under the fire of your infantry.

When the force of the enemy consists of cavalry alone, your infantry (marked in the plan by dotted right angles) should retire jointly with the cavalry, at least if the country does not expose you to be surrounded by some covered place; because in that case your infantry should go and occupy that place, and form an ambuscade.

The rest of the infantry should place themselves in the second line of each division. If the enemy approaches the first line too near, they should fall lightly back upon the two wings of the second, opening the center quickly for the infantry, to fire upon the enemy in platoons, at the same time that your cavalry detach several small parties to ad-

vance briskly to prevent the enemy's forming, who were thrown into confusion by the fire of the infantry. The division which retires will force its march, and go to a greater or less distance according to the pursuit of the enemy. The sustaining division must fall back afterwards till it has passed between the wings of the second division, who must then make the manoeuvre of the first, continuing it alternately till the enemy desists from the pursuit.

To facilitate the retreat of the infantry, and gain some way on the enemy, many have been of opinion that they ought to transport them in waggons; but when the enemy is at our heels, the time is very ill employed in collecting carriages, and harnessing them; those moments are too precious, and should be employed in causing the infantry to move off quickly, by which they will not be exposed to a train of waggons taken in haste, which may soon break, or be put out of order, and may stop

the whole line, which not only retards the infantry, but likewise the cavalry, when they find the route they were to have taken blocked up with broken carriages.

The case is different when the enemy is at some distance, or that you have already got some way before him; then if a waggon breaks, it may be thrown immediately out of the road, and each horse of the carriage may carry two soldiers, or be distributed to other carriages. If many are broke, a part of the men should run on foot for some time till they are tired, and then they may change with some of the stoutest, who may afterwards change with others, according to necessity or the possibility of the case.

When there happens to be a wood in your rear, you need not enter it if the enemy follows you close, and is prevented by your strength; it is better to coast along it by the route marked G, for fear of his coming round you; but if you cannot avoid crossing it, the division C

should pass quickly, and at getting out face to the two flanks of the wood. The division B is to remain at the entrance of it, till they judge that the division C is sufficiently advanced, and then fall back, leaving the infantry for a rear-guard, during the whole passage through the wood; at which time the whole should resume their first disposition.

In all defiles, and passages of bridges, the same manoeuvre should be used as for woods; but the first division having passed, they should form facing the enemy; and the infantry likewise draw up on the other side, upon the edge of the river.

When the country through which you are to retire happens to be mountainous, the division which falls back should guard the heights by small detached parties, or, if possible, guard them themselves.

A body of cavalry retreating without infantry, ought to form in three lines at two hundred paces behind one another; the two last extending their





front, that they may appear more numerous, and draw up on the two sides out of the road. The first line being attacked, the second is to sustain it, the third to wait the retreat of the first, and to sustain the second, and continue to do so alternately.

If the enemy seem to quit the pursuit, the whole corps must resume the order of an ordinary march; with this precaution, that the rear-guard be reinforced, and the advanced guard weakened.

As to the retreat of a small detachment of cavalry, such as go to reconnoitre the enemy, to discover their march, to carry off some officer, or for some other commission, as they are not numerous enough to skirmish, and retreat by rule, they have but two ways to choose; either to fly, or break through the enemy. They ought to determine for the last, when their retreat is cut off on all sides, so that they have no other way to escape but by cutting their way through the enemy sword in hand; but flight is

always less hazardous when it is practicable.

If the officer is certain of the fidelity of his men, and their attachment to him, and sees that they cannot get out of sight of the enemy, but are ready to fall into their hands, he ought to try one means still, which has been known frequently to succeed. He should disperse his party by two and two, by the favour of the first covered place, where they may be at liberty to take so many different routes. It is evident, that two men may wind from right to left, and escape more easily than a party of twelve or twenty, who cannot move so freely.

Mr. Jeney made use of such an expedient successfully in Italy, when the Spaniards having advice of his detachment having slipped to the rear of their army, they cut off his retreat on all sides. The whole party being dispersed, he took two hussars with him, and was followed so close, that every instant he thought he must be taken; however, he saved him-

self by crossing a marshy pond. The enemy ran to turn him, but he got so far before them that they could not take him. He got safe to his post, and in three days the whole detachment met without the loss of a man: which will prove, that in such a situation we need not despair, and that in extreme necessity, the passage of a river or morass ought not to be declined.

In a forced retreat, prudence requires that we should sacrifice every thing to preserve life and liberty; therefore we must not hesitate a moment in disincumbering ourselves of every thing that can burthen us, or retard our march. Equipages, booty, prisoners, all must go, that we may think only of the means of making our retreat most expeditiously.

Having gone through what was proposed at setting out, it must be left to judges to determine how far the end proposed in compiling this essay has been answered. I shall only add, that it is my firm opinion, that a corps of a partisan,

formed according to the arrangement given in the beginning of this treatise, would be not only capable of great service, but would much excell every military establishment that has hitherto taken place in this country.

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